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We are trying out two new features in this issue, and we hope youenjoy them.First, you’ll find a law-related crossword puzzle on page 122. The
puzzle was written by Vic Fleming, a district judge in Little Rock, Arkansas. He
has been a district judge since 1996, teaches a seminar at the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock Bowen School of Law (his alma mater) on law and lit-
erature, and has written both legal humor columns and crossword puzzles for
many years. He is willing to provide crossword puzzles for us in future issues
as well.
Second, you’ll find a new column, “Thoughts from Canada,” by Canadian
judge Wayne Gorman. He is a judge of the Provincial Court of Newfoundland
and Labrador, as well as an active member of the
Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges.
We have nearly 200 Canadian members of the
American Judges Association; they find benefit in
reading not only materials in Court Review that
cover social-science topics (thus usually tran-
scending national boundaries) but also discus-
sions of legal issues as they are resolved in the
United States. We think that our U.S. judges will
also find interest in how Canadian courts resolve
similar issues, and Judge Gorman is willing to
provide examples of that in each issue. 
Please let us know what you think of these
new features—along with any other suggestions
you may have for articles or authors or subjects you’d like to see. You can con-
tact me (sleben56@gmail.com) or my coeditor, Eve Brank (ebrank2@unl.edu). 
Our issue begins with Professor Todd Pettys’ annual review of the past Term’s
United States Supreme Court civil cases. The civil cases were especially interest-
ing this year, and Professor Pettys has done his usual masterful job of reviewing
them. If you have a chance, please thank him for his contribution.
Our second article looks at efforts to improve court performance in the courts
of Ottawa County, Michigan. Most courts could benefit from a similar project, so
we think you’ll find it of interest.
Our third article considers whether it might be possible to lessen the effects
of implicit bias on jurors. Researchers at the National Center for State Courts
conducted an experiment to see whether a specific jury instruction about the
issue might be helpful. 
Finally, we have a review of Ross Guberman’s new book on judicial writing,
Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges. We found the book worth
reading for any judge who writes opinions. (After the book review was prepared,
we noticed that the Oxford University Press had purchased an ad for the book in
this issue too. The ad was purchased through our association staff; the editors of
Court Review are not involved in selling ads for the issues, and we don’t make any
editorial decisions based on ad sales.)—SL 
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unso-
licited, original articles, essays, and book reviews.
Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful infor-
mation to the working judges of the United States and
Canada.  In each issue, we hope to provide information
that will be of use to judges in their everyday work,
whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of
trial, court, or case management, providing substantive
information regarding an area of law likely to be
encountered by many judges, or by providing back-
ground information (such as psychology or other social
science research) that can be used by judges in their
work.  Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts
for Court Review are set forth on page 115 of this issue.
Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For informa-
tion, contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
Cover photo, Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkins@
mac.com). The cover photo is of the Old Quebec City
Courthouse, which opened in 1887 and served as a
courthouse for nearly a century before its present use
for the Quebec Ministry of Justice. 
©2015, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by
the American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member
subscriptions are available for $35 per volume (four
issues per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at
the end of any volume upon notice given to the pub-
lisher. Prices are subject to change without notice.
Second-class postage paid at Williamsburg, Virginia,
and additional mailing offices.  Address all correspon-
dence about subscriptions, undeliverable copies, and
change of address to Association Services, National
Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-
4147.  Points of view or opinions expressed in Court
Review are those of the authors and do not necessarily
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Courts or the American Judges Association.  ISSN:
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In my first column as president of the American JudgesAssociation (AJA), I wrote about how our organization wasworking to improve itself. In the time since, I believe that
effort has proven to be successful.
The growing number of Canadian judges in the AJA is a
reflection of our commitment to representing all judges across
North America. In this issue, you will see a new column from
Canadian judge Wayne Gorman with the heading “Thoughts
from Canada.” He has provided some very practi-
cal advice on the issue of recusal, along with an
overview of Canadian recusal rules.  
It is not simply an influx of new Canadian
judges that has fueled the renewed growth of our
organization. Rather, the AJA has worked hard to
spread its message that it is the Voice of the Judi-
ciary®, with goals to reflect the diversity of judges
across North America while keeping its commit-
ment to Making Better Judges®.
As part of that effort, this year we began publishing a series
of email broadcasts entitled “The Rundown” in an effort to
explain how the AJA represents its members. If you haven’t
provided your email address or your spam filter has prevented
you from receiving the emails, you can find them at this link:
http://amjudges.org/updates/.   
In October, the AJA’s newest position paper, “Procedural
Fairness and Drug Treatment Courts:  Making The Judge The
Key Component,” will be presented at our annual educational
conference. This position paper builds off the groundbreaking
work on procedural fairness that has been a hallmark of the
AJA. Our efforts to bring the four principles of procedural fair-
ness to the forefront of the judicial conversation will continue
next year, as we have reached an agreement to work with the
National Association for Court Management to develop a joint
position paper and benchbook on the topic of the procedurally
fair court.  
This year, former AJA president Elliott Zide led an effort to
revise our bylaws. In this issue of Court Review, there is a dis-
cussion of these proposed bylaws changes. (See pp. 126-27.)
They are designed to modernize the AJA’s governing structure
so that it is better able to withstand challenges in the 21st cen-
tury. The new bylaws will be voted upon by the membership at
the Seattle conference, so I hope you will take a
moment to read about these proposed changes.
Even if you’re not going to be at the conference,
please let us know what you think.   
If you are thinking about attending the con-
ference, it will be held October 4-7 at the Shera-
ton in downtown Seattle. This year the AJA has
partnered with the Washington State Judiciary
and the National Association of State Judicial
Educators (NASJE). Bringing together three organizations into
one conference was challenging and exhilarating. Every year I
look forward to the AJA conference, but as a result of these
joint efforts, the scope of the offerings is truly exceptional. If
you haven’t been to an AJA conference, perhaps this is the time
to attend. In closing, let me repeat the challenge that I made in
my first column: Do more than be a member. Join one of the
many AJA committees, and share your thoughts about making
us all better judges. Think about running for the Board of Gov-
ernors and working to grow the AJA. Get involved, if in no
other way than by sending the incoming president John Con-
nery an email with advice and asking him to share it with the
membership. Lend us your voice to strengthen our voice in the
ongoing debate about role of judges. I hope you enjoy the rest
of this issue of Court Review; when you set it down, I hope that
you will take up the AJA.
President’s Column
Brian MacKenzie
Footnotes 
1. See Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] S.C.R. 259 (Can.);
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 566 U.S. 868 (2009); and
Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 451
(A.C. 1999) (U.K.). For cases in the United Kingdom involving an
actual conflict of interest, courts have referred to these as “auto-
matic disqualification cases.” See Locabail (U.K.) Ltd., [2000]
Q.B. 451, 463-64 (U.K.).  
2. 2015 S.C.C. 25 (Can.).
3. Matthew Groves suggests that the “facts raised in support of a
claim of bias will always depend upon the wider context of the
case in which they are raised but [in] most cases may be located
within what Deane J described in Webb v The Queen as the ‘four
distinct, though sometimes overlapping main categories’ of bias.
Those categories are interest, conduct, association and extraneous
information.” Matthew Groves, Empathy, Experience & the Rule
Against Bias in Criminal Trials, 36 CRIM. L. J. (Aus.) 84 (2012).
Over the last number of years, a significant number ofCanadian judges have joined the American JudgesAssociation (Judge Russell Otter of the Ontario Court
of Justice is the current AJA vice president). This has resulted
in these Canadian judges receiving copies of Court Review.
This has provided Canadian judges with an excellent source of
information concerning the law as it exists and unfolds in the
United States of America.  Though there are substantial differ-
ences between the constitutions and legal systems of our two
countries, there are also great similarities.  Thus, Court Review
provides Canadian judges with information that is useful and
relevant to their consideration and application of Canadian law
in the daily fulfillment of their judicial duties. 
But no similar Canadian publication provides information
on Canadian law to American judges, though such information
might be of interest or use to American judges. 
The purpose of this column in Court Review is to provide
such information concerning the Canadian legal system to
American judges. Thus, the editors willing and the readers being
interested, for each issue of Court Review I will write a brief col-
umn on a development in Canadian law that, because of its uni-
versal nature, might be of interest to an American judge.  
The Canadian cases I refer to may be at any level of court,
but because this edition of Court Review includes the first of
two articles reviewing the past Term of the Unites States
Supreme Court, I have chosen to review a recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada that I believe might be of inter-
est and of use to American judges. 
YUKON FRANCOPHONE SCHOOL BOARD V. YUKON
(ATTORNEY GENERAL)
The test for recusal based upon an allegation of reasonable
apprehension of bias is essentially the same in Canada, Eng-
land, and the United States: it is an objective test, which asks
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the presid-
ing judge was unable to carry out his or her function impar-
tially.1 In Yukon Francophone School Board v. Yukon (Attorney
General),2 the Supreme Court of Canada had a recent opportu-
nity to consider when a judge should recuse himself or herself.
One of the interesting things about this decision is that it con-
siders the issue from the perspective of intervention in the trial
process by the trial judge and in relation to the trial judge’s
involvement with an association with similar goals as one of
the litigants.3
The Background:
In Yukon Francophone School Board v. Yukon (Attorney Gen-
eral), the Yukon Francophone School Board sued the Yukon
government “for what it claimed were deficiencies in the provi-
sion of minority language education. The trial judge ruled in the
Board’s favour on most issues.” On appeal to the Yukon Court of
Appeal, a new hearing was ordered. The Court of Appeal con-
cluded that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the
part of the trial judge based upon a number of incidents during
the trial as well as the trial judge’s involvement as a governor of
a philanthropic Francophone community organization in
Alberta.  An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.  
The Supreme Court agreed, in part, with the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the trial judge’s actions during the
hearing raised a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
The Trial Judge’s Behavior During the Trial:
During the course of the trial, the trial judge acted in an
unfortunate manner. The Supreme Court of Canada referred
to the trial judge’s behavior as being “troubling and problem-
atic” (at paragraph 44). This included not providing counsel
for the Attorney General an opportunity to be heard; suggest-
ing, without evidence, that counsel’s request for an adjourn-
ment was a delay tactic; and treating counsel with a general
lack of respect (such as making disparaging remarks). 
The Test:  
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the test for
determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias has
arisen is an objective one: “what would a reasonable, informed
person think.”  The Court noted, at paragraph 22, that the
“objective of the test is to ensure not only the reality, but the
appearance of a fair adjudicative process. The issue of bias is
thus inextricably linked to the need for impartiality.” However,
the Supreme Court also indicated that this does not mean that
THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN
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Wayne K. Gorman
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4. See R. v. McGrath, [2014] 2014 NLCA 40, 2014 CarswellNfld 317,
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 252, ¶ 27 (Can. Nfld.). 
5. R. v. Crawford, [2015] 2015 ABCA 175, 2015 CarswellAlta 879, ¶
7 (Can. Alta.). 
6. R. v. Huang, [2013] 2013 ONCA 240, 2013 CarswellOnt 4225, 115
O.R. (3d) 596, ¶ 33 (Can. Ont.). A distinction, however, has been
made between comments or questions to a witness and “state-
ments made by a judge during a colloquy,” see R. v. Elliott, [2015]
2015 BCCA 295, 2015 CarswellBC 1957, ¶ 21 (Can. BC.). The fol-
lowing comment by the trial judge to the accused during the
accused’s testimony in Huang led to the Court of Appeal conclud-
ing that a reasonable apprehension of bias had been established:
“I’m going to have you stop right there for a minute. Do you under-
stand what perjury is, Sir? Do you want to take a minute with your
counsel and she will instruct you what perjury is and that usually
it incorporates about a year in custody.” 2013 ONCA 240, ¶ 10.
a judge can have “no prior conceptions [or] opinions” (at para-
graphs 33 and 34):
Judicial impartiality and neutrality do not mean that a
judge must have no prior conceptions, opinions or sensi-
bilities. Rather, they require that the judge’s identity and
experiences not close his or her mind to the evidence and
issues. There is, in other words, a crucial difference
between an open mind and empty one.
A judge’s identity and experiences are an important
part of who he or she is, and neither neutrality nor impar-
tiality is inherently compromised by them. Justice is the
aspirational application of law to life. Judges should be
encouraged to experience, learn and understand “life” —
their own and those whose lives reflect different realities.
The Trial Judge’s Interventions:
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of
Appeal that the trial judge’s conduct during the application
raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.  The Supreme Court
concluded that though appellate courts “are rightfully reluc-
tant to intervene on the grounds that a trial judge’s conduct
crossed the line from permissibly managing the trial to
improperly interfering with the case” (at paragraph 54), the
“fine balance” was “inappropriately tipped in this case” (at
paragraph 55):
While the threshold for a reasonable apprehension of
bias is high, in my respectful view, the “fine balance” was
inappropriately tipped in this case. The trial judge’s
actions in relation to the confidentiality of student files,
the request to have Mr. DeBruyn testify by affidavit, the
disparaging remarks, and the unusual costs award and
procedure, taken together and viewed in their context,
would lead a reasonable and informed person to see the
trial judge’s conduct as giving rise to a reasonable appre-
hension of bias.
The Trial Judge’s Involvement 
with a Francophone Association:
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the trial judge’s involvement in a
Francophone organization raised a reasonable apprehension of
bias.  The Supreme Court held that the mere involvement of
the trial judge in an organization similar to one of the litigants
was insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias
(at paragraph 62): 
In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the trial
judge’s involvement as a governor of the Fondation
franco-albertaine was problematic. There is, however, lit-
tle in the record about the organization. In particular, it is
difficult to see how, based on the evidence, one could
conclude that its vision “would clearly align” with certain
positions taken by the Board in this case or that the trial
judge’s involvement in the organization foreclosed his
ability to approach this case with an open mind. Standing
alone, vague statements about the organization’s mission
and vision do not displace the presumption of impartial-
ity. While I agree that consideration of the trial judge’s
current role as a governor of the organization was a valid
part of the contextual bias inquiry in this case, I am not
persuaded that his involvement with an organization
whose functions are largely undefined on the evidence,
can be said to rise to the level of a contributing factor
such that the judge, as the Court of Appeal said, “should
not have sat on [this case]” (at para. 200).
CONCLUSION
Normally we can avoid applications for recusal, suggesting
that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists, before they are
raised by declining to hear a particular case.   However, once
the case commences, excessive intervention will invariably
lead to such an argument being raised.  We do not have adopt
a “sphinx-like” demeanor,4 but the Alberta Court of Appeal has
suggested that there will be few “occasions during a trial where
the accused is represented by counsel that a judge may ques-
tion a witness without creating the impression that he or she is
entering the fray and leaving judicial impartiality behind.”5
Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal has indicated that trial
judges “are, at bottom, listeners” and thus, it “is counsel’s job,
not the trial judge’s, to explore inconsistencies in a witness’ tes-
timony.”6 Thus, although excessive intervention is one poten-
tial basis for someone to claim a reasonable apprehension of
judicial bias, it is a basis that we can easily avoid.  
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up is Hard to Do: A Trial Judge’s
Reading Blog) can be found on the web page of
the Canadian Association of Provincial Court
Judges. He also writes a regular column (Of
Particular Interest to Provincial Court Judges)
for the Canadian Provincial Judges’ Journal.
Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published. His latest arti-
cle is Ours is to Reason Why: The Law of Rendering Judgment, 62
Criminal Law Quarterly 301 (2015). Comments or suggestions
to Judge Gorman may be sent to wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca.
For United States judges who may want to read in full one of the
Canadian decisions referred to here, you can contact Judge Gor-
man and he will forward a copy to you by email. 
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ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT TAKEN: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE WORLD’S
BEST JUDGES, Oxford University Press, 2014. 376 pp. $24.95.
With more than 30,000 judges in the United Statesalone, you’d expect to find an impressive array ofjudicial-training materials. And there are some good
ones—the American Judges Association’s video training series
for handling domestic-violence cases (education.amjudges.org)
stands out as one recent example. But there’s not much out
there specifically on judicial writing, and what’s out there is
generally limited in scope (reflecting the idiosyncratic views of
a single author or even of a committee), outdated, or . . . well,
boring. 
Legal-writing consultant Ross Guberman has entered the
market with a new book on judicial writing. Any judge who
writes opinions should read it.
Guberman organized his book, Point Taken: How to Write
Like the World’s Best Judges, around opinion excerpts taken
from 34 judges well known for their writing abilities. The cho-
sen judges are mostly appellate judges (six are trial judges);
mostly from the United States (six are from Canada, the United
Kingdom, or Australia); and mostly still on the bench (13 are
no longer active). The current judges include John G. Roberts,
Jr., Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Kagen
from the United States Supreme Court; United States appellate
judges Marsha Berzon, Edward Carnes, Frank Easterbrook,
Brett Kavanaugh, Alex Kozinski, Richard Posner, O. Rogeriee
Thompson, and Diane Wood; and Canadian Chief Justice Bev-
erley McLachlin. The former judges include Benjamin Car-
dozo, Lord Denning, Learned Hand, Robert Jackson, John Paul
Stevens, Roger Traynor, and Patricia Wald.
With that lineup and Guberman’s review of hundreds of
their opinions, it’s no surprise that Point Taken is filled with
example after example not just of great writing, but also great
judging.
This book follows the format of Guberman’s book on writ-
ing for lawyers, Point Made: How to Write Like the Nation’s Top
Advocates, now in its second edition (2014). In both books,
Guberman covers key points—micro and macro—in brief
writing and opinion writing, using examples from top lawyers
and judges to demonstrate the goals and techniques he urges
readers to adopt.
At the macro level, Point Taken covers crafting opinion
openers, reporting the facts, and constructing an effective legal
analysis. The micro level focuses on words and phrases to use
or avoid, elements of style (like the effective use of em dashes,
semicolons, and colons), and what Guberman calls stylistic
“nice-to-haves”: metaphors, similes, analogies, literary refer-
ences, and rhetorical devices. 
Guberman’s goal is to “[g]o bold on judicial opinions,” pro-
viding a “guide that will transform the work of some of the
world’s best judges into a concrete step-by-step method acces-
sible to judges at all levels and across jurisdictions.” A lofty
goal, and Guberman largely succeeds.
My favorite part of the book is his section on openers.
Those of us who write a large number of opinions under time
pressure may opt for a standard format we can use to turn out
opinions quickly. Or your court may have a preferred (or at
least standard) method of writing opinions. Guberman has
identified four basic styles for the opener, and he provides
examples and suggestions for each style. Just reading through
these took me out of the rut I had been in and got me to try
something different for the next opinion on my plate. Guber-
man provides useful suggestions about when each opener may
be most appropriate and about how best to approach each
style.
The four types of openers break down along two variables—
length and whether they answer the case’s main question.
Guberman calls a short opener that answers the main question
a “sound bite” and a longer one an “op-ed.” If the opener
leaves the result unresolved, a succinct one is a “teaser” and a
detailed one is a “trailer.” 
In the section on openers alone, Guberman provides 28
examples from great writers (as well as a clunker from Justice
Anthony Kennedy for contrast). You immediately see that a
great opinion can start with any of these methods.
Since the value of the book comes through its examples,
let’s look at some of the openers he included. We’ll start with a
teaser from Alex Kozinski—only four sentences, but you know
what the issue is, and you’re ready to read more:
Long after the public spotlight has moved on in
search of fresh intrigue, the lawyers remain. And so we
find ourselves adjudicating a decade-old dispute
between Gennifer Flowers and what she affectionately
refers to as the “Clinton smear machine”: James
Carville, George Stephanopolous and Hillary Clinton.
Flowers charges that said machine destroyed her reputa-
tion by painting her as a fraud and a liar after she dis-
closed her affair with Bill Clinton. We decide whether
Flowers’s claims are timely and, if so, whether they sur-
vive a motion to dismiss.
You might respond that it’s easy to make a case between
Flowers and the “Clinton smear machine” into a good read.
But Guberman offers a three-sentence teaser from Antonin
Scalia that quite effectively sets up a much more mundane
issue:
Upon joining a criminal conspiracy, a defendant’s
membership in the ongoing unlawful scheme continues
until he withdraws. A defendant who withdraws outside
the relevant statute-of-limitations period has a complete
defense to prosecution. We consider whether, when the
defendant produces some evidence supporting such a
defense, the Government must prove beyond a reason-
Writing Like the Best Judges
Steve Leben
A B O O K  R E V I E W
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able doubt that he did not withdraw outside the statute-
of-limitations period.
And Guberman offers a teaser from Lord Denning that’s
hard to beat for sheer fun: “This is the case of the barmaid who
was badly bitten by a big dog.”  
For an example of a trailer opener, Guberman breaks down
in detail one that Richard Posner used to start an immigration
appeal:
Questor Cecaj, who together with his wife is seeking
asylum in the United States, was active in the Democra-
tic Party of Albania at a time when the country was
ruled by the Socialist Party. Persecution of Democratic
Party activists during this period has been found in a
number of cases. In 1998, Cecaj—whom the immigra-
tion judge found wholly credible—was arrested follow-
ing a political protest in which he had participated. He
was detained for six days and during that period was
beaten by masked police with rubber truncheons and
also kicked, suffering injuries that required his hospi-
talization. A few days after his release from the hospital
a member of the Socialist Party accosted Cecaj on the
street and fired a gun near his head, an act that Cecaj
sensibly interpreted as a threat. He fled to Greece but
returned in 2000 and resumed his political activity with
the New Democratic Party, which is related to the
Democratic Party, though the precise relationship is
obscure. The following year, after an unsuccessful run
for mayor of his hometown, he stood for the Albanian
parliament on the New Democratic Party ticket in his
hometown, which was dominated by the Socialist Party.
Although he was a well-known local figure and candi-
date for public office, he was arrested during the cam-
paign and beaten by the police, ostensibly for not hav-
ing identification papers on him. He also received
threatening phone calls, which he believed came from
the police. The last straw was the kidnapping of his 10-
year-old brother by unknown persons who told the
child that he was being kidnapped because of Cecaj’s
political activity and that the child “would end up dead”
if Cecaj “didn’t do what they say.” The child was
released unharmed after a few hours but Cecaj received
a call in which they “said that [the kidnapping] was the
last warning.” Cecaj prudently abandoned his candi-
dacy and left Albania with his wife.
The immigration judge ruled that Cecaj’s testimony
did not establish that he had been persecuted.
Guberman spends more than a page analyzing this Posner
opener. He points out that it shows “how skilled writers use
the passive voice on purpose”: “The passive voice improves the
flow of the first two sentences: the construction ‘was ruled by’
helps keep ‘country’ closer to Albania, and the ‘has been found
in a number of cases’ keeps ‘activists’ closer to the previous
sentence, which is about politics, not case law.” He continues
to analyze the additional uses of passive voice that kept the
focus on Cecaj and his story, notes the strong, vivid verbs (fled,
fired, ruled, accosted, kicked, dominated, stood for, aban-
doned, left), and the use of em dashes to slow down the reader
when Posner reported a key
fact—that the immigration
judge found Cecaj “wholly
credible.” 
But Guberman also
points to reasons Posner’s
style “is not always to every-
one’s liking”—using a tone
that “is so cocksure and so
one-sided that the immigra-
tion judge is made to sound
like a fool” (Guberman
assumes that “there must be
some counterargument”)
and including expressions of
opinion (“Cecaj sensibly
interpreted,” “Cecaj pru-
dently abandoned”) when the facts were quite strong enough
on their own. 
Examples and discussions like this are what make the book
so strong. We see some of the very best judicial writers at their
very best. Guberman identifies what works about their
approaches as well as what doesn’t. He raises questions judges
must consider that go beyond craft to how they see their role
as a judge. And judges reading the book get to decide what
makes sense for their own work.
After covering how to write clear, engaging openers,
Guberman moves on to address the other main tasks of an
opinion—telling the facts and providing the legal analysis.
Here too, Guberman fills each chapter with examples of great
writing and explains why some methods work better than
others, especially in certain types of cases. For example, in
presenting the facts, he urges taking out all details that play
no part in the analysis, while providing detailed treatment of
the facts that are the most important to your reasoning. In
legal analysis, when citing or distinguishing cases, he again
urges homing in on only the key facts that link—or distin-
guish—two cases.
Guberman provides advice on grammar and writing style
both in footnotes to the opinion excerpts found throughout
the book and in separate sections on style and punctuation.
The footnotes are easy to skip for readers who want to stick to
the main topic but are rich in useful comments about writing
style. In addition to pointing out Posner’s skilled use of passive
voice, for example, Guberman uses footnotes to compliment
John Roberts for purposefully splitting infinitives to keep his
message clear. (Roberts, by the way, is clearly a Guberman
favorite. Not only does Guberman include a great many
Roberts opinions with gushing praise [“[t]he magic of
Roberts’s writing”], Guberman also spares Roberts from criti-
cism he gives to others. When Roberts uses “the fact that” [p.
90], nary a word is said. When Patricia Wald uses it [p. 129],
Guberman inserts a tsk-tsk footnote citing to Strunk and
White.)
Guberman also devotes a chapter to dissents. Here, he takes
a position that may not be applicable to all multi-member
courts: “The best dissents aren’t written like majority opinions
that just so happen to reach a different conclusion. They use
the majority opinion as a springboard instead, poking holes in
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1. One case I handled with this approach was State v. Morlock, 190
P.3d 1001, 1016-33 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (Leben, J., dissenting),
rev’d 218 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2009).  
2. I do not suggest that I am above such a dissent. See Fischer v.
State, 206 P.3d 13, 16-22 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (Leben, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing majority opinion requiring that convicted
murderer be brought to rural courthouse 287 miles from his
prison for brief hearing rather than participating by phone; con-
cluding, “The court’s opinion in this case will undoubtedly
become one of the most widely read decisions in every prison and
jail library in Kansas. It didn’t need to be.”), rev’d 295 P.3d 560
(Kan. 2013). I have admittedly omitted reference to my dissenting
opinions that have gathered only dust, not further review by my
state’s supreme court.
the majority’s reasoning and highlighting points of disagree-
ment, all the while tipping a hat to the court’s authority and
dignity.” 
Someone I respected—and I’m sorry that I can’t recall
who—once told me the opposite. He suggested writing at least
the first draft of the dissent as if it were a majority opinion,
crafting responses to the majority only after you first have a
coherent opinion going the other way. At least some of the
time, that may be a better way both to maintain the collegial-
ity of a court and, if further review is still possible, to convince
a higher court to take and reverse the decision. Doing so keeps
the main point—the issue before the court—as the main point,
avoiding potential focus on what may seem an altogether non-
collegial attack, especially to one’s colleagues.1 For example,
Guberman suggests that in some cases a dissent can point to
the majority as elitists with no concern for their limits, in other
cases as populists pandering to popular will. No doubt that can
be done, and Guberman’s advice aptly reflects several dissents
from the United States Supreme Court that he includes as
examples. On most courts, though, I would think that biting
dissents should be used sparingly.2
The book offers more for appellate judges than trial judges,
but there’s enough to satisfy both audiences. For example, trial
judges often set out facts (or even conclusions of law) in sep-
arately numbered paragraphs; some appellate courts now do
this too as an aid to public-domain citations. In either case,
Guberman explains why good headings can still help the
reader process facts or legal analysis.
If Guberman decides to do a second edition of the book (as
he’s already done for Point Made), he could do a bit more for
trial judges on how they might make factual findings that are
readable yet effective in allowing appellate review. He also
could add some current state-court judges, presently unrepre-
sented in his sample. And he should provide some advice on
the important question he introduces at the front of his book:
Just whom should the judge regard as the audience for the
opinion? An opinion written for a lay audience would surely
differ from one written for lawyers. In today’s environment,
with respect for public institutions, including the judiciary, at
historically low levels, and with much greater Internet access
to judicial opinions, we might all benefit from making judicial
opinions more accessible to the lay reader.
But my suggestions and occasional criticisms should not be
overstated. Guberman’s Point Taken is—by far—the best book
I’ve seen on judicial writing.
Guberman has compiled excellent examples of judicial
writing (as well as a few examples of poor writing). He
explains the craftsmanship these exemplary judges use. And
he provides solid guidance for how you could at least attempt
to do similar work. 
Any judge who studies the book will become a better writer.
And an already talented writer who reads the book will also
become a better judge. 
Steve Leben is a judge on the Kansas Court of
Appeals and the coeditor of Court Review. The
National Center for State Courts awarded him
the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence in 2014 in recognition of his recent
efforts promoting procedural fairness in Amer-
ica’s courts and his long-time commitment to
judicial-system improvements.
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There can be little doubt about the ruling for which theSupreme Court’s 2014-2015 Term will best be remem-bered. In its penultimate public session—and over four
fierce dissenting opinions—the Court struck down all remain-
ing state bans on same-sex marriage, thereby simultaneously
setting in place an enormous milestone in the legal rights of
America’s gays and lesbians and, for the ruling’s opponents,
raising the specter of Lochner and judicial illegitimacy. We will
begin by briefly revisiting that landmark ruling and then will
turn to the Term’s other significant decisions, concerning
issues involving administrative law, antitrust, due process,
elections and redistricting, employment discrimination, evi-
dence, executive power, fair housing, federal jurisdiction,
health care, religion, speech, takings, taxation, and more. 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
It is inconceivable that this Term summary will be the first
to carry the news to anyone that, in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment grants
same-sex couples the right to marry and to have their mar-
riages recognized in all states. Joined by the Court’s four
Democratic appointees, Justice Kennedy found that “the right
to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”2 With
respect to the equal-protection claim, the Court did not settle
upon a standard of review for sexual-orientation classifications
but did twice say that sexual orientation is an immutable
trait—a finding that likely helps to lay the groundwork for
finding heightened scrutiny appropriate in a future case. The
Court’s four other Republican appointees each filed dissenting
opinions excoriating the majority for, in their view, ignoring
the limits of the Constitution and of the judicial role and halt-
ing midstream a dynamic public debate about the marital
rights of same-sex couples.
Given the ruling’s familiarity among all readers, a novel
approach to summarizing the majority and principal dissent-
ing opinions seems in order. Here, then, are simply words and
phrases from those two texts. Taken together, these snippets
nicely capture the stark disagreements that so sharply divided
the Court.
From Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority (with quo-
tation marks omitted): Identity. Profound hopes and aspira-
tions. Centrality. Immutable nature. Fundamental. Individual
dignity and autonomy. A lonely person might call out only to
find no one there. Loving and nurturing. Keystone of our
social order. Demeans gays and lesbians. Stigma and injury.
Disparage their choices and diminish their personhood. Disre-
spect and subordinate. Urgency. Substantial and continuing
harm.
From the principal dissent, written by Chief Justice Roberts
(with quotation marks again omitted): Not a legislature. Gov-
ernment of laws, not of men. Stealing this issue from the peo-
ple. Dramatic social change. Act of will, not legal judgment.
Just who do we think we are? If I were a legislator. Indefensi-
ble as a matter of constitutional law. Dred Scott. Aggressive
application of substantive due process. Breaks sharply from
decades of precedent. Marriage as traditionally defined.
Lochner. Exalts the role of the judiciary. Celebrate. But [the
Constitution] had nothing to do with it.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
For nearly 20 years, following its decision in Paralyzed Vet-
erans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,3 the District of Columbia
Circuit had held that, although the Administrative Procedure
Act does not require notice-and-comment procedures when an
agency issues a rule interpreting one of its own regulations,4
such procedures are required when an agency wishes to replace
one of its existing interpretations with a new interpretation
that is significantly different. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation,5 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Para-
lyzed Veterans doctrine, finding it inconsistent with the APA’s
plain language.6 When poised to withdraw an earlier regula-
tory interpretation concerning whether mortgage-loan officers
are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, therefore, the
Department of Labor was not required to provide the public
with notice or an opportunity to comment.
Perhaps even more importantly, a few justices used the case
as an opportunity to signal—for the second time in three
years—that major changes may be coming to this area of the
law. Two terms ago, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center,7 Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion casting
doubt on Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.8 and Auer v. Rob-
Weddings, Whiter Teeth, Judicial-
Campaign Speech, and More: 
Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2014-2015 Term
Todd E. Pettys
Footnotes
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Id. at 2604.
3. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
5. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
6. See id. at 1206 (“Because an agency is not required to use notice-
and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is
also not required to use those procedures when it amends or
repeals that interpretive rule.”).
7. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
8. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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bins,9 the two leading cases calling for judicial deference to
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito filed a short opinion in Decker, say-
ing that Justice Scalia had raised important issues for determi-
nation in a future case. Here in Mortgage Bankers Association,
Justice Scalia filed another opinion reiterating his concerns,10
Justice Thomas argued at length that Seminole Rock and Auer
raise separation-of-powers problems,11 and Justice Alito filed
an opinion stating that Justices Scalia and Thomas had
“offer[ed] substantial reasons why” the deference prescribed
by those cases “may be incorrect” and declaring that these
issues should be “explored through full briefing and argu-
ment” in a future case.12 An invitation has plainly been issued.
An even more familiar form of deference—deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.13
to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions—also drew the justices’ atten-
tion this Term. As noted under the Health Care heading below,
the Court in King v. Burwell14 found Chevron deference categor-
ically inappropriate in the Term’s major ruling on the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, in large part because the
“extraordinary case” involved the expenditure of billions of dol-
lars and the health care of millions of people and thus wasn’t
likely regarded by Congress as an appropriate occasion for
deferring to the Internal Revenue Service. In its ruling handed
down several days later in Michigan v. EPA,15 the Court applied
the Chevron framework but found deference to the EPA inap-
propriate, concluding that the agency’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act was unreasonable. Potentially even more signifi-
cant in that case was Justice Thomas’s concurrence, in which he
suggested that the entire Chevron-deference regime might be
unconstitutional under separation-of-powers principles.
ANTITRUST
If you live in North Carolina and are interested in whiten-
ing your teeth, North Carolina’s dentists are eager—perhaps a
bit too eager, it turns out—to win your business. Beginning in
2006, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, on
which many practicing dentists sit, began sending cease-and-
desist letters to non-dentists who were offering teeth-whiten-
ing services. The Board contended that those non-dentists
were engaged in the unlicensed practice of dentistry. When the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged the Board with anti-
competitive conduct, the Board sought the shelter of state-
action immunity. 
The Supreme Court ruled against the Board in North Car-
olina State Board of Dental Exam-
iners v. FTC.16 Writing for a six-
member majority, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged that the
nation’s antitrust laws “confer
immunity on anticompetitive
conduct by the States when act-
ing in their sovereign capac-
ity.”17 Yet the dentist-laden
Board was not entitled to that
immunity here, Justice Kennedy
explained, because its actions
against non-dentists had not
been supervised by the State
itself and thus State officials
were not politically accountable
for the Board’s anticompetitive
actions. Absent such political accountability, the Court rea-
soned, there was too great a risk that the Board’s dentists would
restrain trade to advance their private interests. Joined in dis-
sent by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Alito argued that the
majority’s holding was contrary to the Court’s precedent, was in
tension with principles of federalism, and would create confu-
sion about what, precisely, a state must do in order to ensure
that a given agency can successfully claim immunity.
DUE PROCESS
In Kerry v. Din,18 Fauzia Din—an American citizen whose
spouse formerly worked in Afghanistan’s Taliban regime—
claimed a violation of her Fifth Amendment procedural-due-
process rights. The State Department had denied her husband’s
visa application and, when it did so, provided no statement of
reasons beyond citing the federal statute that withholds visas
from persons who have engaged in terrorist activities. A frac-
tured Court rejected Din’s claim that, on the strength of a lib-
erty interest in living with her husband in the United States,
she was entitled to a more complete explanation of the gov-
ernment’s reasons.
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
concluded that Din did not have any constitutionally protected
liberty interest at stake, finding Din’s assertion to the contrary
“absurd” under the original meaning of the Due Process
Clause.19 Justices Kennedy and Alito found that, even if Din did
have a protected liberty interest, she had received all of the
process she was owed when the State Department cited the ter-
rorism statute. Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
9. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
10. See Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (“The agency is free to interpret its own reg-
ulations with or without notice or comment; but courts will
decide—with no deference to the agency—whether that interpre-
tation is correct.”).
11. See id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Because this doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power to
an executive agency, it raises constitutional concerns. This line of
precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to pre-
cisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”).
12. Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
15. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
16. 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
17. Id. at 1110 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
18. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
19. Id. at 2133 (plurality op.).
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23. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664.
24. Id. at 2657.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2678.
27. See U.S. Const. art., I, § 3; id. at amend. XVII.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
29. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). Justice Alito concurred in the judgment,
while Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.
30. Id. at 2033.
31. Id. at 2032.
32. 42 U.S.C. ¶ 2000e-5(b).
33. 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
34. Id. at 1653-54.
Kagan, Justice Breyer dissented,
concluding that spouses have a
liberty interest in living together
and that “[t]he generality of the
statutory provision cited and the
lack of factual support mean that
here, the reason given is analo-
gous to telling a criminal defen-
dant only that he is accused of
‘breaking the law.’”20
ELECTIONS AND 
REDISTRICTING
Led by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Court held in Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission21 that
the Elections Clause does not bar Arizona voters from using that
state’s initiative process to shift from the legislature to an inde-
pendent commission the task of drawing federal congressional
districts. The Elections Clause states that “[t]he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . .”22 The Arizona Legislature argued that, in light
of that clause’s use of the phrase “the Legislature thereof,” it had
the sole power to draw the state’s districts for congressional elec-
tions. While concluding that the legislature did have standing to
bring that claim (because it was “an institutional plaintiff assert-
ing an institutional injury, and it commenced this action after
authorizing votes in both of its chambers”23), the Court rejected
the legislature’s claim on the merits. The Court concluded that
the term “legislature” often refers broadly to the law-making
power (rather than, more narrowly, to an elected representative
body), and that the term carries that broader meaning in the
Elections Clause. The clause’s main purpose, the Court said,
“was to empower Congress to override state election rules, not
to restrict the way States enact legislation.”24 Even if the nation’s
founders did not foresee that citizens in some states would one
day make heavy use of initiatives as a law-making method, Jus-
tice Ginsburg said, “the invention of the initiative was in full
harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the
font of governmental power.”25
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent, arguing
that the majority had failed to “explain how a constitutional
provision that vests redistricting authority in ‘the Legislature’
permits a State to wholly exclude ‘the Legislature’ from redis-
tricting.”26 If the term “legislature” really were as capacious as
the majority found, the Chief Justice argued by way of exam-
ple, there would have been no need for the Seventeenth
Amendment, which transferred the Senator-selecting power
from “the Legislature” of each state to “the people thereof.”27
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
ACCOMMODATION
Frequenters of American shopping malls know that Aber-
crombie & Fitch operates a chain of music-pumping, sexual-
ity-celebrating clothing stores for the younger set. Until just
this year, Abercrombie applied a strict “Look Policy” to its
employees while they were on the job, regulating their cloth-
ing, hair color, nail length, piercings, and more. Samantha
Elauf, a practicing Muslim, alleged that she was denied a job at
an Abercrombie store because she wore a headscarf; “caps”
were among the things the policy banned, and Elauf wore a
headscarf to her interview. The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) filed a Title VII suit on her behalf,
alleging that Abercrombie had discriminated against her
because of her religion.28 A jury returned a verdict in Elauf’s
favor, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that Abercrombie
could not be held liable because Elauf had not told Abercrom-
bie that she would require a religious accommodation.
Led by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed in EEOC v. Aber-
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.29 Distinguishing between motives
and knowledge, the Court explained that “an employer who
acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate
Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated sus-
picion that accommodation would be needed.”30 The Court
found that Elauf could prevail merely by showing that her
“need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in [Aber-
crombie’s] decision.”31
CONCILIATION
If the EEOC finds there is “reasonable cause” to believe that
a complainant’s employer has violated Title VII, the agency is
statutorily obliged to “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation, and persuasion.”32 In Mach Mining, LLC v.
EEOC,33 the Court unanimously ruled that courts may review
the EEOC’s compliance with that conciliation-seeking require-
ment but that the scope of the review is narrow. The Court
rejected Mach Mining’s argument that courts should “do a deep
dive into the conciliation process” akin to courts’ immersive
involvement in supervising employers’ and unions’ statutory
duty to negotiate with one another in good faith.34 Rather, Jus-
tice Kagan explained, a court only has the power to satisfy itself
(on the strength of an EEOC affidavit or otherwise) that the
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37. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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39. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
40. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment.
41. Id. at 1362 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
42. Id. at 1364-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
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agency has notified the employer of the plaintiffs’ allegations
and has given the employer some form of “opportunity to dis-
cuss the matter in an effort to achieve voluntary compliance.”35
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by adopting the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, which says two things: that discrimi-
nation based upon pregnancy is a form of forbidden sex-based
discrimination and that an employer must treat “women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . the
same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”36
In Young v. United Parcel Service,37 the Court took up the mean-
ing of the latter provision. Peggy Young alleged that her
employer, United Parcel Service, violated the Act’s second provi-
sion by refusing to accommodate her temporary, pregnancy-cre-
ated inability to lift heavy objects, while nevertheless accommo-
dating certain other (albeit not all) classes of employees who
were temporarily unable to work. Led by Justice Breyer, a
divided Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had erred when it
affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for UPS.
When a plaintiff brings a disparate-treatment claim alleging
intentional discrimination based upon the plaintiff’s status as a
pregnant woman, the Court said, she may rely upon McDonnell
Douglas’s familiar, three-phase burden-shifting framework.38
That is, the plaintiff may first try to present evidence sufficient
to support a prima facie claim of intentional pregnancy-based
discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds on that score, the
employer may then offer nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions. The plaintiff can then try to prove that the employer’s
explanation is merely a pretext for forbidden discrimination.
When trying to demonstrate pretext, the Court said, a plaintiff
may argue that “the employer’s policies impose a significant bur-
den on pregnant workers,” that the employer’s proffered ratio-
nale for its actions is “not sufficiently strong to justify the bur-
den,” and that an inference of intentional justification is thus
appropriate.39 Here, the majority found that Young had created
an issue of material fact on the first of those three phases of
analysis and so remanded for further proceedings.40
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas in dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that, under the Act, Young was entitled to—and
had received—“accommodations on the same terms as other
workers with disabling conditions.”41 By injecting a discussion
of “significant burden[s]” and “sufficiently strong” justifications
into the analytic framework for disparate-treatment claims, Jus-
tice Scalia said, the Court had strayed far from the text of the
statute and had muddied Title VII’s distinction between 
disparate-treatment claims and claims alleging disparate
impact.42
EVIDENCE
In Warger v. Shauers,43 the
Court rejected a plaintiff’s effort
to secure a new trial based upon
alleged juror misconduct. After a
jury ruled in favor of the defen-
dant in a personal-injury case,
one of the jurors provided the
plaintiff with an affidavit indicat-
ing that, during the jury’s deliber-
ations, another juror had made
statements which, if true, indi-
cated that she might have lied
during voir dire. Based upon that
account of the jury’s delibera-
tions, the plaintiff sought a new
trial, but the Court ruled the evidence inadmissible. Rule
606(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that,
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . , a juror may
not testify about any statement made . . . during the jury’s delib-
erations . . . .”44 The Court found that entertaining the plaintiff’s
motion for a new trial would entail just such an inquiry.
EXECUTIVE POWER & PASSPORTS
Virtually all readers will recall Justice Jackson’s famous
admonition that the President’s powers are at their “lowest ebb”
when he acts contrary to the will of Congress.45 In Zivotofsky v.
Kerry,46 we saw that, even when the President’s powers are at
low tide, they can still be sufficient to deliver him a victory.
The case concerned Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky’s
desire to have Israel listed as his place of birth both on his pass-
port and on the consular report of his birth abroad. A 2002 fed-
eral statute purported to give him precisely that right. Because
Zivotofsky had been born in Jerusalem, however, the State
Department declined his request, in keeping with the Execu-
tive Branch’s long-standing refusal to acknowledge any single
country’s sovereignty over that coveted and contested city.
With Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court found
that Congress could not compel the State Department to satisfy
Zivotofsky’s request. Justice Kennedy explained that, by direct-
ing the President to “receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers,”47 the Constitution gives the President the “recogni-
tion power”—the power to decide whether the United States
recognizes a given entity as a legitimate state. Based upon that
text, together with historical practices, prior Court rulings,
and the practical need for the nation to speak with one voice
on such matters, the Court held that the President has the
exclusive “power to recognize or decline to recognize a foreign
state and its territorial bounds.”48 By trying to compel the State
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Department to issue statements
that contradict the President’s
own recognition judgments
about Jerusalem, the Court
said, Congress was illegiti-
mately trying to exercise the
recognition power for itself.
Justice Thomas concurred
in part and dissented in part,
distinguishing between pass-
ports and consular reports of
births abroad. He concluded
that none of Congress’s enu-
merated powers authorizes it
to demand that Israel be listed
as a Jerusalem-born American
citizen’s place of birth on his or
her passport but that Congress could control such matters on
consular reports of births abroad pursuant to its powers under
the Naturalization Clause.49 Justice Scalia dissented, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Alito. He rejected the majority’s
finding that the President’s powers in this area are exclusive,
arguing that the statute on which Zivotofsky relied had noth-
ing to do with formally recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over
Jerusalem, that the statute was a permissible exercise of the
Naturalization Clause, and that the majority was facilitating
tyranny by allowing the President to claim sole control over
foreign-sovereignty issues.
FAIR HOUSING ACT
In one of the Term’s most closely watched cases among civil-
rights activists, the Court ruled 5-4 in Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc.,50 that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) permits disparate-
impact claims, such that a person or entity may be liable under
the statute even in the absence of discriminatory intent. The
FHA declares, among other things, that it is impermissible to
“refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable . . . a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.”51 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy zeroed in on the “otherwise make unavail-
able” language and found that, with that phrasing, Congress
was targeting “the consequences of an action rather than the
actor’s intent.”52 The Court relied heavily upon its reading of
Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.53 and on the fact that,
when amending the FHA in 1988, Congress took no steps to
reject the rulings of nine different circuit courts of appeals that
the FHA permits disparate-impact claims. Justice Kennedy
emphasized, however, that disparate-impact claims should be
allowed only under limited circumstances, such as when gov-
ernment officials cannot identify “valid interest[s] served by
their policies.”54
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, Justice Alito wrote the principal dissent, arguing that
the phrase “because of” in the statutory language quoted above
requires the presence of discriminatory motive or intent. He
further contended that Griggs is far from a model of admirable
statutory interpretation and that the Court’s ruling threatened
to make it more difficult for government officials to take steps
aimed at providing acceptable housing for their poorest resi-
dents, lest those steps (such as rodent-infestation treatment)
drive up the cost of housing and thereby make that housing
less affordable for racial minorities.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
In a brief per curiam reversal of the Fifth Circuit, the Court
ruled in Johnson v. City of Shelby55 that it was error to enter
summary judgment for the municipal defendant when the
plaintiffs failed to declare explicitly in their complaint that
they were making their claims under Section 1983. A plaintiff
“must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has sub-
stantive plausibility,” the Court explained, but “no heightened
pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations
of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to
state a claim.”56
REMOVAL AND THE AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY
REQUIREMENT
Over the dissent of four justices who believed the issue was
not properly before them, the Court ruled in Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co. v. Owens57 that, when a defendant attempts
to remove a case to federal court on diversity-jurisdiction
grounds, the notice of removal need not contain evidence sub-
stantiating the defendant’s good-faith allegation that the
amount-in-controversy requirement is met. Rather, the defen-
dant must submit supporting evidence only if the plaintiff or
the court subsequently challenges that allegation.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND
EX PARTE YOUNG 
Dividing 5-4, the Court ruled in Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Center, Inc.,58 that neither the Supremacy Clause nor the
principles of equity famously illustrated by Ex parte Young59
enable health-care providers to sue for an injunction that
would force a state to comply with Section 30(A) of the Med-
icaid Act. Section 30(A) requires a state “to assure that [Med-
icaid] payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so
that care and services are available under the plan at least to
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the extent that such care and services are available to the gen-
eral population in the geographic area.”60 Providers of habita-
tion services in Idaho filed a lawsuit alleging that the state’s
reimbursement rates were lower than Section 30(A) permits.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Supremacy Clause supplied the
providers with a cause of action for an injunction compelling
the state to increase its rates, but the Supreme Court reversed.
All nine members of the Court agreed that the Supremacy
Clause does not itself create causes of action but instead
merely “instructs courts what to do when state and federal law
clash.”61 The Court divided 5-4, however, on whether relief
was available under principles of equity and Ex parte Young.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Scalia found that
two aspects of the Medicaid Act signaled Congress’s desire to
foreclose private enforcement of Section 30(A): Congress’s
decision to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to withhold Medicaid funds from a state that violates Sec-
tion 30(A) and the “judicially unadministrable,” “judgment-
laden . . . complexity” of Section 30(A)’s requirements.62 Writ-
ing for the dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that Congress
surely anticipated that equitable relief would be available, that
the remedy of withholding Medicaid funds was far too heavy-
handed to be plausibly regarded by Congress as an effective
lone remedy, and that the ease with which the majority deemed
equitable relief precluded “threatens the vitality of our Ex parte
Young jurisprudence.”63
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, ARTICLE III, AND CONSENT
In its ruling four years ago in Stern v. Marshall,64 the Court
held that Article III does not permit a bankruptcy judge to
issue a final judgment on a state common-law claim that “is in
no way derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy law.”65
The issues last Term in Wellness International Network v.
Sharif66 were whether a creditor’s particular claim amounted to
a Stern claim and, if it did, whether Stern’s constitutional bar
still stood if the parties consented to the bankruptcy court’s
adjudication of the claim. Wellness (the creditor) sought a
bankruptcy court’s declaration that a trust the debtor adminis-
tered was actually the debtor’s alter ego and that the trust’s
assets should therefore be treated as part of the debtor’s estate.
Led by Justice Sotomayor, the Court ruled 6-3 that, even if the
claim was indeed “a Stern claim” (an issue the majority
declined to reach), the bankruptcy court could take jurisdic-
tion of it. Because “Article III courts retain supervisory author-
ity” over proceedings in bankruptcy courts, the Court said,
“allowing bankruptcy litigants to waive the right to Article III
adjudication of Stern claims does
not usurp the constitutional pre-
rogatives of Article III courts.”67
Writing the principal dissent,68
Chief Justice Roberts—the
author of Stern—argued that
Wellness’s claim was not a Stern
claim and that the bankruptcy
court should be allowed to take
jurisdiction of the claim on those
narrow grounds. By finding that
the parties’ consent empowers a
bankruptcy court to take juris-
diction of a claim that is indeed a
Stern claim, the Chief Justice
argued, the Court was deviating from Article III’s requirements
and was setting a precedent that invites further “erosion of
[Article III courts’] constitutional power.”69
EQUITABLE TOLLING 
In United States v. Wong,70 the Court ruled 5-4 that the two
limitations periods set out in the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)—the two-year period for seeking administrative review
and the six-month period for seeking judicial review—are sub-
ject to equitable tolling. Relying heavily upon the Court’s 1990
decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,71 Justice
Kagan reasoned that there is a strong yet rebuttable presumption
that statutory limitations periods may be equitably tolled, and
she found no persuasive evidence that Congress had intended to
exempt the FTCA’s time bars from such adjustment. The Gov-
ernment’s primary argument had been that the FTCA’s limita-
tions periods were jurisdictional and thus beyond courts’ power
to disregard. The Solicitor General pointed out, for example,
that Congress framed those time bars in emphatic language, stat-
ing that a claim “shall be forever barred” if the statute’s deadlines
are not met.72 The majority found the statute’s language unre-
markable. Instead, the Court focused on Congress’s decision not
to “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the juris-
diction of the district courts”73 when describing the limitations
periods and on Congress’s physical separation of the provisions
concerning the filing deadlines and district courts’ jurisdiction
to hear FTCA claims.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Alito argued that “[t]he
statutory text, its historical roots, and more than a century of
precedents show that [the FTCA’s] absolute bar is not subject
to equitable tolling.”74 Pointing to the statute’s unqualified lan-
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guage, for example, Justice
Alito wrote that “it is beyond
me how Irwin’s judge-made
presumption announced in
1990 can trump the obvious
meaning of a statute enacted
many decades earlier.”75
PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT
In a major victory for the
Obama Administration, the
Court in King v. Burwell76
rejected a potentially eviscer-
ating attack that had been
brought against the Patient
Protection and Affordable
Care Act. In one of that legis-
lation’s previously obscure
provisions—Section 36B—Congress had adopted language
declaring that taxpayers purchasing health-insurance policies
would be eligible for certain federal tax credits only if they pur-
chased their insurance on “an Exchange established by the
State.”77 Only 16 states had established their own health-insur-
ance exchanges under the legislation, however, leaving the fed-
eral government to establish the exchanges in the other 34.
The Internal Revenue Service had interpreted the statute as
authorizing tax credits in all states, regardless of which sover-
eign had established the exchanges.
By a vote of 6-3, and in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,
the Court ruled that tax credits are indeed available for policies
purchased on all exchanges, regardless of whether the state or
the federal government set them up. The Court declined to
defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation, finding
that with “billions of dollars” and the healthcare of “millions
of people” at stake, this was an “extraordinary case” in which
Chevron deference was inappropriate.78 The Chief Justice also
conceded that Section 36B’s plain language appeared to sup-
port the challengers’ interpretation. The Court nevertheless
found that other portions of the statute rendered the “estab-
lished by the State” language ambiguous. Moreover, when con-
sidering the legislation’s overarching goals, the Court found it
implausible that Congress would have wanted to deny tax
credits in those states in which the federal government had
established the exchanges. Without federal tax credits in those
states, far fewer individuals would have been able (and
required) to purchase health insurance, thus keeping many
healthy premium payers out of the insurance pool—and with
those healthy individuals on the sidelines, the costs of cover-
age would have risen even higher, thereby making coverage
financially accessible to even fewer people and putting the
whole system into “a death spiral.”79
Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito in
dissent. He argued that “[w]ords no longer have meaning if an
Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by
the State’”80 and that, just as he believed it had three years ear-
lier in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,81
the Court was abandoning standard principles of statutory
interpretation just for the sake of upholding legislation it
favored.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The unanimity that eluded the Court in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.82—the high-profile religious-freedom ruling
that came down at the end of the 2013-2014 Term—proved
achievable this year in Holt v. Hobbs.83 Led by Justice Alito, the
undivided Court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Cor-
rections had violated the statutory religious-freedom rights of
Gregory Holt, a Muslim inmate. Holt wanted to grow a half-
inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs, but prison
officials refused, citing security concerns. The Court held that,
contrary to the demands of the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Arkansas was substantially
burdening Holt’s religious practice without a powerful justifi-
cation for doing so. With respect to Arkansas’s suggestion that
Holt could successfully conceal contraband in a half-inch
beard, for example, the Court believed that prison guards
could search Holt’s proposed beard as readily as they could
search the top of a prisoner’s hirsute head.
RESTATEMENTS
One might sensibly ask why “Restatements” appears as a
heading in a Term summary of this sort. Here’s the answer. In
Kansas v. Nebraska,84 the Court adopted a Special Master’s rec-
ommendations for resolving a water dispute between Kansas
and Nebraska. Of broadest interest to judges, practitioners,
and scholars will be Justice Scalia’s skeptical remarks regarding
the law-defining value of Restatements. In a separate, one-
paragraph opinion, he wrote:
[M]odern Restatements . . . are of questionable value
and must be used with caution. The object of the origi-
nal Restatements was “to present an orderly statement of
the general common law.” Over time, the Restatements’
authors have abandoned the mission of describing the
law, and have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations
for what the law ought to be. . . . Restatement sections
[that aim to extend the law in one direction or another]
should be given no weight whatsoever as to the current
state of the law, and no more weight regarding what the
law ought to be than the recommendations of any
respected lawyer or scholar. And it cannot safely be
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assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement
provision describes rather than revises current law.85
SPEECH
The Term produced three noteworthy free-speech rulings:
one on judges’ campaign speech, one on specialty license
plates, and one on local sign ordinances.
In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,86 the case concerning
judges’ campaign speech, the 5-4 Court handed down a rare
defeat for a speaker who found herself on the receiving end of
a content-based speech restriction. Florida is among the 39
states that select at least some of their judges through popular
elections, and is among the 30 states that—in keeping with the
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct—
do not allow judicial candidates to personally solicit campaign
funds. Lanell Williams-Yulee, who was seeking a seat on a
Florida county court, sent local voters a letter seeking cam-
paign contributions. The Florida Bar successfully brought
ethics charges against her.
Everyone agreed that Florida was discriminating against
Williams-Yulee’s speech because of its content. For seven jus-
tices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan
on one side, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
on the other—that meant strict scrutiny was in order. (Joined
by Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to argue
that states should have “substantial latitude” to limit the role
of money in judicial elections.87 These two justices joined the
rest of the Chief Justice’s opinion.) Led by Chief Justice
Roberts, the majority concluded that this was “one of the rare
cases in which a speech restriction” could survive that
demanding analysis.88 The Court first found that Florida had a
“compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary.” Recent campaign-finance cases in
which the Court took a narrower view of the government’s
compelling interests were inapposite, the Chief Justice said,
because those cases concerned politicians, rather than judges
who are obliged to pay no regard to the preferences of their
supporters.
Turning to the issue that most sharply divided the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts then concluded that the law was narrowly
tailored. Florida’s regulation of judicial candidates’ speech was
admittedly underinclusive, he said, insofar as the state allowed
judges’ campaign committees to solicit contributions and
allowed judges to send thank-you notes to donors. In an espe-
cially important passage, however, the majority found that
underinclusiveness is not itself a freestanding problem in free-
speech cases. Rather, underinclusiveness becomes problematic
when it signals that the government is not actually pursuing the
objective it has declared or when it indicates that the law is not
actually advancing the government’s declared interests. In the
eyes of the majority, neither of
those problems was present
here. Nor did the Court find the
law troublingly overinclusive by
virtue of the fact that it barred
judicial candidates from person-
ally soliciting campaign contri-
butions by any means of com-
munication, from any person,
and in any amount. Strict
scrutiny does not demand “per-
fect tailoring,” Chief Justice
Roberts said, and he refused to
“wade into th[e] swamp” of try-
ing to distinguish between the
integrity-compromising effects of solicitations communicated
by one means rather than another, or sent to one group of
prospective donors rather than another, or seeking one amount
rather than another.
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia found Florida’s rule
“wildly disproportionate” to its “ill-defined interest” in pre-
serving the reality and appearance of judicial integrity.89 Justice
Scalia argued, for example, that it makes no sense to bar a judi-
cial candidate from seeking campaign contributions from close
friends and family members or from sending out mass solicita-
tions that do not “target any listener in particular.”90 Justice
Kennedy filed a separate dissent to underscore the importance
of protecting free speech in elections of all kinds, and Justice
Alito filed a dissent arguing that Florida’s law was “about as
narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.”91
As an entryway into the Court’s license-plate ruling in
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,92 Justice
Alito (again finding himself in dissent) proposed that you take
the following test. You are sitting near a roadway in Texas and,
as cars pass by, you see many specialty license plates. Some, for
example, say “I’d Rather Be Golfing,” some say “Roll, Tide,
Roll” (accompanied by the University of Alabama’s logo), some
say “Always One of a Kind” (accompanied by an image of a can
of Dr. Pepper), some say “Get It Sold with Re/Max (accompa-
nied by an image of that real-estate company’s famous bal-
loon), and so forth. Would you regard those messages as the
speech of the cars’ drivers or as the speech of the State of Texas
itself? The occasion for the thought experiment arose when
Texas refused to honor the Sons of Confederate Veterans’
request that the state issue a specialty license plate bearing that
non-profit organization’s name and logo, together with an
image of the Confederate flag.
Writing for the five-member majority (consisting of the
Court’s Democratic appointees and Justice Thomas), Justice
Breyer found that all Texas license plates—even plates whose
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messages and designs have been
proposed by the likes of golfers,
Alabama alumni, the manufac-
turer of Dr. Pepper, and
Re/Max—are Texas’s own gov-
ernmental speech and that the
First Amendment rules regard-
ing content- and viewpoint-
based discrimination thus do
not apply. The Court relied
heavily upon its 2009 ruling in
Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum,93 in which the justices
held that monuments in a
municipal park are government
speech even when they are
designed by private parties, and
that—without fear of First
Amendment liability—Pleasant
Grove City thus could decline
to erect a monument bearing a
religious organization’s core principles. Justice Breyer found
that specialty plates fall into the same category. Like monu-
ments, he said, states have commonly used license plates to
convey messages; Texas takes ownership of any privately pre-
pared license-plate designs that it adopts; and the state has
maintained control over which messages the plates convey.
Writing for the Court’s four dissenting members, Justice
Alito found it implausible that anyone would regard personal-
ized messages of the sort listed above as coming from the State
of Texas itself, a conclusion that he bolstered with an appendix
showing nearly 60 specialty plates that Texas has approved. In
his view, the state had created a limited public forum through
its specialty-plate program and thus could not commit view-
point discrimination when deciding which proposed messages
to accept.
The Court’s nine members all agreed on the appropriate
outcome in Reed v. Town of Gilbert;94 what divided them was
the best path to get there. The Town of Gilbert, Arizona, had
an elaborate sign ordinance that, on its face, plainly treated
signs differently based upon their content. Signs with “ideo-
logical” content could be up to 20 square feet and could be
posted indefinitely, for example, while a “temporary direc-
tional sign relating to a qualifying event” could be no more
than 6 square feet and had to be removed within one hour of
the advertised event’s conclusion. A small church that met in
alternating locations and relied heavily upon temporary direc-
tional signs challenged the ordinance, saying that it violated
the members’ First Amendment rights.
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Alito, and Sotomayor, Justice Thomas concluded that the ordi-
nance was indeed unconstitutional. Because the ordinance was
content-based on its face, Justice Thomas explained, it was
automatically subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of the pur-
poses that drove the town to enact it. Even if the town’s prof-
fered purposes were compelling (namely, preserving the town’s
beauty and promoting traffic safety), the Court held that the
ordinance’s content distinctions were “hopelessly underinclu-
sive.” Temporary directional signs, for example, are no more or
less attractive or dangerous than many of the signs that the
town permitted to be larger and to be erected for longer peri-
ods. The Court thus found that the ordinance was not actually
serving the town’s articulated objectives. (Reed and Williams-
Yulee likely will be cited for years to come as the leading pair
of cases on underinclusiveness in free-speech analysis.)
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, Justice Alito
filed a concurring opinion aimed at assuring readers that,
through content-neutral sign regulations, cities will be able to
achieve their safety and aesthetic goals. Justice Breyer con-
curred in the judgment, arguing that strict scrutiny should not
automatically apply to all content-based speech regulations and
that—relying on content discrimination “as a rule of thumb”—
a court should instead ask “whether the regulation at issue
works harm to First Amendment interests that is dispropor-
tionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.”95 Joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Kagan similarly con-
curred in the judgment. She argued that the majority’s ruling
placed countless sign ordinances across the country in jeop-
ardy and that—rather than hold that strict scrutiny automati-
cally applies to all sign ordinances that make content distinc-
tions—the Court should simply have said that the town’s ordi-
nance “does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny,
or even the laugh test.”96
TAKINGS
Imagine you are a raisin grower. After you have harvested
your raisins each year, a large truck backs up to your facility at
the direction of the Department of Agriculture’s Raisin Admin-
istrative Committee and takes a portion of your crop (47 per-
cent of it in 2002-2003, less of it in others). Whether you are
paid anything at all for the seized raisins will depend on
whether there is any money left over after the Committee
deducts expenses that it incurs in selling or otherwise dispos-
ing of the raisins as part of its overall effort to maintain a sta-
ble raisin market. In some years, there will be no such funds
remaining; in some years, the funds you are paid will amount
to less than the costs you incurred to grow the raisins. Yet you
presumably derive benefits from the Committee’s effort to
maintain a healthy raisin market, and those benefits might be
substantial. One year, you dig in your heels and refuse to grant
the truck access to your crops, and in return the Department
of Agriculture fines you in an amount equal to the value of the
raisins you refused to hand over, plus an additional sum for
your disobedience. Has your property been taken, without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause? The Horne family found itself in that situation and
brought precisely that claim. And in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture,97 the Court ruled in favor of the Horne family.
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Writing for an eight-member majority (all except Justice
Sotomayor), Chief Justice Roberts first found that the govern-
ment’s duty to pay just compensation for physical takings
applies to takings of personal property and not just to real
property. Distinguishing between regulatory and physical tak-
ings, the Court could find nothing in the text or history of the
Fifth Amendment to indicate otherwise. The Chief Justice then
found that the fact that there had been a physical taking for
which just compensation was owed was not negated by the
Committee’s occasional payments to raisin growers of any net
proceeds or by the fact that raisin growers could simply grow
other crops if they did not wish to participate in the federal
raisin program.
In the most divisive part of the Court’s ruling—a part that
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan refused to join—the
majority refused to remand the case for a calculation that the
Government had argued was appropriate. The Government
had insisted that remand was needed to determine whether
just compensation was owed (and thus whether any Fifth
Amendment violation had actually occurred) because, it said,
the value of the benefits that the Hornes had derived from the
federal raisin program might well have exceeded the value of
the raisins that the Government wished to collect. The major-
ity declined to take that approach, however, finding instead
that the benefits of a regulatory program cannot themselves
constitute just compensation for a physical taking. Rather, just
compensation must be measured by the value of the physically
taken property itself. Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
Justice Breyer embraced the Government’s argument on this
point, finding that if the benefits of the federal raisin program
exceeded the value of the raisins taken, then there had been no
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
TAXATION
Those who have earned income in multiple states over the
course of a single year know that states commonly offer their
residents an income-tax credit for taxes paid to other states on
income earned in those other jurisdictions. Maryland chose
not to fully provide such a credit,98 and so residents like Brian
and Karen Wynne found themselves being taxed twice on the
same portion of their income. In Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne,99 the Court ruled 5-4 that Maryland’s taxa-
tion system violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, Justice Alito explained that, under the Court’s
precedents, the Constitution forbade Maryland from imple-
menting a system of taxation that treated interstate economic
activity less favorably than it treated economic activity within
its own borders. Applying the “internal consistency test,” the
Court asked whether interstate commerce would be disadvan-
taged, relative to intrastate commerce, if every state in the
Union adopted a taxation system
identical to Maryland’s.100 The
Court found that it would and that
Maryland’s system was thus indis-
tinguishable from a tariff.
Joined by Justices Scalia and
Kagan in dissent, Justice Ginsburg
argued that the majority’s ruling
robbed Maryland of its ability to
make a constitutionally permissi-
ble policy choice and that the
Wynnes’ remedy lay in their state’s
political processes. Joined in relevant part by Justice Thomas,
Justice Scalia wrote separately to underscore his skepticism
about much of the dormant Commerce Clause enterprise and
to argue that, while the “internal consistency test” might
resemble one formulation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical
imperative, it has no roots in the Constitution’s text or struc-
ture. In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his previ-
ously announced willingness to abandon the dormant Com-
merce Clause altogether.
Meanwhile, to facilitate its own tax-collection efforts, Col-
orado enacted a law requiring retailers that do not themselves
collect Colorado sales and use taxes to notify consumers of
their state tax obligations and to provide the Colorado Depart-
ment of Revenue with periodic reports on the retailers’ trans-
actions with Colorado residents. The Direct Marketing Associ-
ation—a trade group that includes online retailers and others
who market their products directly to consumers—challenged
the law. They argued that, among other things, the law was
simply a device to evade Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,101 the
1992 case in which the Court held that retailers cannot be
compelled to collect sales taxes from customers in states with
which the retailers lack a “substantial nexus.” The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the Tax Injunction Act barred federal courts from
enjoining enforcement of the Colorado law. In Direct Market-
ing Association v. Brohl,102 the Court unanimously reversed,
finding that an order blocking Colorado’s notice and reporting
requirements would not (in the words of the Tax Injunction
Act) “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or col-
lection” of Colorado taxes.103
The retailers’ victory celebration was undoubtedly tempered
by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Acknowledging that the
issue was not now properly before the Court, Justice Kennedy
wrote separately to say that online retail sales have grown
stratospherically in the years since Quill was decided, that Quill
is “inflicting extreme harm and unfairness on the States,” and
that the Court should find an opportunity to reconsider Quill’s
“doubtful authority.”104 Should the Court indeed abandon Quill
in a future case, online retailers might look back on Direct Mar-
keting Association as a brief and largely inconsequential victory.
[T]he Court 
ruled 5-4 that 
Maryland’s 
taxation system
violated the 
dormant 
Commerce
Clause.
98. Maryland provided the credit for what it called the “state” portion
of its income taxes but not for what it called the “county” portion
of its income taxes.
99. 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
100. Id. at 1802.
101. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
102. 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
104. Direct Marketing Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
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OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk,105 the Court held
that federal law does not require employers to pay employees
for the time they spend undergoing antitheft security screen-
ings at the end of their shifts.
In T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell,106 the Court ruled
that, when denying an application to build a cell-phone tower,
a locality must provide a written statement of the reasons for
the denial and—although the notification of the denial and the
statement of reasons need not appear in the same document—
the two must be provided “essentially contemporaneously”
with one another.107
Divided 5-4, the Court ruled in Michigan v. EPA108 that—
even though the EPA eventually conducted cost-benefit analy-
ses indicating that the benefits of regulating fossil-fuel-fired
power plants would easily justify the costs—the EPA erred by
not considering costs at all when initially determining whether
such regulation was (in the language of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990) “appropriate and necessary.”
The Court divided 5-4 on several issues in Alabama Legisla-
tive Black Caucus v. Alabama,109 including on whether the
plaintiffs had pled an Equal Protection Clause claim of district-
specific racial gerrymandering. A majority of the justices con-
cluded that they had. Led by Justice Scalia, the dissenters
accused the majority of “act[ing] as standby counsel for sym-
pathetic litigants” and of “invit[ing] lower courts similarly to
depart from the premise that ours is an adversarial system
whenever they deem the stakes sufficiently high.”110
Resolving a circuit split, the Court ruled unanimously in
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank111 that a bankruptcy court’s refusal to
confirm a debtor’s proposed repayment plan under Chapter 13
is not a final order that the debtor can immediately appeal as
of right, so long as the court’s order “leaves the debtor free to
propose another plan.”112
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees to
hire attorneys and other professionals to assist them with their
duties. In Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC,113 the Court held
that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a bankruptcy
court to award attorneys’ fees to those professionals for time
they spend defending their fee applications.
Drawing from the law of trusts, the Court held in Tibble v.
Edison International114 that the beneficiaries of a retirement plan
covered by ERISA may bring an action against their plan’s fidu-
ciaries for failure “to properly monitor investments and remove
imprudent ones,” so long as the alleged breach of that ongoing
fiduciary obligation occurred within the prior six years.115
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,116 the Court refused
to abandon its 1964 ruling in Brulotte v. Thys Co.117 that a
patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his or her
invention after the patent’s term has expired. Marvel Enter-
tainment was thus allowed to escape from a contract in which
it had agreed to pay royalties—apparently in perpetuity—to
the inventor of a toy that allows one to shoot foam from the
palm of one’s hand, à la Spider Man. And with that gift-shop-
ping idea, we bring this year’s Term summary to a close. 
LOOKING AHEAD
Among the headlines next Term will be the Court’s ruling in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,118 in which the justices
will return to the divisive topic of affirmative action in higher
education. Another attention-grabbing case will be Friedrichs v.
California Teachers Association,119 in which the Court will re-
examine whether public-sector employees can be compelled to
make financial contributions to unions (a question on which
some of the justices have recently expressed strong doubts, as
signaled by the “Doubting Abood” title of last year’s Term sum-
mary). Among the many other civil-law issues currently slated
for the justices’ attention are whether Indian tribal courts may
adjudicate tort claims against nonmembers,120 whether a state
can be sued in another state’s courts without its consent,121
whether the focus should be on total population or on voter
population when deploying the Equal Protection Clause’s “one
person, one vote” principle,122 the test for calculating the
statute of limitations in federal constructive-discharge
claims,123 the breadth of Congress’s power to confer standing
for claims of statutory violations,124 and the appropriate use of
statistical averages when evaluating whether class certification
is appropriate.125
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Today, a well-functioning court is expected to resolve largevolumes of work in a fair and orderly way withindemanding time frames. The overall goal is quality
administration in all phases of court operations, yet achieving
this goal in practice means navigating the shoals of tight bud-
gets, workplace politics, and the heavy press of daily business.
Courts are under enormous stress these days, and as a result it
should come as no surprise that too many courts are infected
with pessimistic court leadership. Winston Churchill is often
reported to have said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every
opportunity, the optimist sees the opportunity in every diffi-
culty.”1 A high-performance court makes the effort to reject
pessimism as it looks to improve its administrative practices,
even in tough times. To seize the opportunity for continuous
improvement and rally support throughout the court, though,
takes coordinated planning and follow-through.
The bottom line is that court leaders need to work together
at organizational change. In two recent articles in Court
Review, we emphasized the necessity of judicial involvement
and commitment if administrative improvement is to take hold
and thrive. One point was that developing shared, court-wide
agreement among judges on how court personnel should work
together requires accepting two primary responsibilities: the
role each judge has in making decisions and the administrative
role judges have in making the system work. Judges benefit
from orderly and stable court administration because it helps
enhance preparation of all parties, augments the understand-
ing of outstanding issues, and clarifies future procedural
events necessary to bring final resolution. However, in any
courthouse, making effective administrative practices a reality
is a team effort; it requires conscious effort to organize work
processes in a way that clarifies and engages the joint contri-
butions of judges and court staff.2
A second point was that courts have different organizational
cultures, and as a result, each court must build its own path to
high performance by taking into account its own particular cir-
cumstances. Deciding what course of action to take and how
to structure a court’s management requires deep understanding
of the court’s internal dynamics. As a consequence, what works
in a given court is highly dependent on the personalities, skills,
and interests of the sitting judges and executive court admin-
istration. Knowledge of a court’s culture is a crucial factor
when seeking to improve operational effectiveness.3
This article takes key themes from these earlier pieces,
including sharing the leadership vision, having a clear cus-
tomer focus, exploring the culture, measuring performance,
and getting everyone involved, and it shows the specific and
practical steps one court has used to put them in place and to
sustain court improvement over time. That court, the 20th Cir-
cuit Court and the Ottawa County Probate Court (hereafter the
Ottawa Court), located in western Michigan, has used a strate-
gic-planning process for more than 10 years to establish agree-
ment on what quality judicial administration means and to ini-
tiate actions to make its plan a reality. While strategic planning
is a process that holds great promise for organizational
improvement, the hard truth is that more than 75% of such
efforts fail. For this reason, looking more closely at the Ottawa
experience and path to success offers practical insight into
how to avoid a common end result—the strategic plan as
“doorstop or dust collector.” 
The key to the Ottawa Court’s success is the commitment to
strong judicial and court executive leadership, creation of a
culture congenial to innovation, inclusion of staff at all levels
of the court, and consistent follow-through and accountability
to each other. Learning how to make the most effective use of
the court’s limited resources by focusing on established priori-
ties is a key attribute necessary to create a high-performance
court. As part of its continuous improvement efforts, the
Ottawa Court invited the National Center for State Courts to
evaluate the court’s strategic-planning process using the High
Performance Court Framework.
In 2010, the National Center for State Courts developed the
High Performance Court Framework (hereafter the Frame-
work) to clarify what court leaders can do to chart a clear
course for court improvement.4 Because quality court adminis-
tration is a goal to be achieved, not a given, the high-perfor-
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mance concept asks two basic questions: are we doing things
right and are we doing the right things? Operational court man-
agement focuses on doing things right, and many tools have
been developed to foster improvement (e.g., CourTools5). In
developing the Framework, the concept of performance has
been broadened to add strategic or performance-management
concerns, which address the second question: are we doing the
right things? In courts, as with any organization, it is the strat-
egy, driven by the vision of leadership, that defines what the
right things are. Process improvements alone cannot guarantee
that a court will be successful or fulfill its mission. The effort
of the Ottawa Court to enhance the two aspects of manage-
ment, strategic and operational, aligns with many of the con-
cepts and approaches detailed in the Framework. Its experi-
ence provides a powerful example of how to develop a court’s
total management capabilities.
What the Ottawa Court has accomplished is neither easy
nor obvious. And at all times, ultimate success or failure of this
ongoing effort rides with the court’s judges and their engage-
ment. For this reason, we hope judges from outside this par-
ticular jurisdiction will appreciate the specific strategies, tech-
niques, and examples of how judges and court staff can better
work together to improve overall court operations and cus-
tomer satisfaction.
In this article, the Framework provides the lens by which to
appraise performance management in the Ottawa Court.
Therefore, the article begins by highlighting relevant aspects of
the Framework. It then turns to a summary of the court’s
strategic thinking and planning process with an emphasis on
how the court keeps it meaningful, illustrated by some exam-
ples of implementation. The article concludes with observa-
tions and practical suggestions from Ottawa County court
leaders to others seriously interested in building and sustain-
ing a robust commitment to strategic management. 
HIGH PERFORMANCE COURT FRAMEWORK 
The Framework’s rationale is to encourage court leaders to
strive for excellence in the administration of justice and to bet-
ter communicate their efforts to a wide audience, including
members of the public and policymakers. There is benefit from
taking a systematic approach to the study and practice of high
performance. Operating from a comprehensive framework
helps translate a court’s mission statement and overall business
strategy into specific, quantifiable goals and allows for the mon-
itoring of the organization’s performance. It helps demonstrate
how a court’s objectives are affected by its managerial culture,
identifies measurable categories of performance, and suggests
approaches on how to assemble and learn from performance
information. Absent a framework, “it is very difficult to predict
which change efforts will work, to see how new programs
might conflict, or to anticipate potential trade-offs among per-
formance areas. A framework helps make clear how perfor-
mance results can be used by courts to reshape their day-to-day
operations and strengthen their institutional performance.”6
Because management practices and court workflow
processes can always be improved, courts should continually
seek to do better than what they are doing already. The role of
performance management is to identify which processes are
most in need of improvement (doing the right things). This
requires attention to strategy, which informs the allocation of
resources for undertaking improvement efforts of the most
strategically important processes in the near term and long
term. To develop and sustain this capacity, the Framework sug-
gests court personnel at all levels should strive to enhance four
areas of performance management. 
First, setting and communicating a leadership vision or “pic-
ture of the future” is a critically important and deeply strategic
activity that many court leaders fail to adequately do. While it
may seem like a simple activity for the court executive team to
share a strategic vision of where they would like their court to
go and the obstacles that must be overcome to get there, many
do not take the time needed to share this vision with all mem-
bers of the court. Important steps to create and effectively ben-
efit from a shared vision include the ability of the chief judge
and court administrator to create or elicit the initial vision; to
translate that vision into administrative activities that make the
vision real; and to articulate and sell this vision to other judges,
managers, and staff members as either the right or best way to
reach the goal. Court leaders need to provide a comprehensive
vision for their court that a significant number of judges and
other court staff will embrace and support.
Second, deciding what strategies to employ, what course of
action to take, and how to structure a court’s management
requires a deep understanding of the court’s internal dynam-
ics—what is often referred to as the court’s culture. This
dimension addresses leaders’ and employees’ understanding
and agreement with stated values. What distinguishes maturity
is the extent to which those values move beyond virtuous
words in a mission statement to actually being understood and
practiced by all working in the court. Evidence of a mature
court organizational culture includes a thoughtful application
of change-management principles and practices by court lead-
ership; the degree of ownership court staff members feel for
the vision and values; their degree of participation in shaping
the court’s culture and ways of working; and the level of trust
and communication throughout the court. The centrality of
culture is highlighted by the words of Louis Gerstner, the for-
mer CEO of IBM, who stated, “I came to see . . . that culture
isn’t just one aspect of the game—it is the game.”7
Third, a key perspective for improving operations overall is
the recognition that the interests, values, and rights of all par-
ticipants in the legal process is a court responsibility. Courts
deliver services, and participants in the legal process are their
valued customers. From that perspective, customer needs
should shape thinking when court practices are evaluated,
policies are implemented, and court staff are trained. This idea
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spans across all interactions the court has with the public and
is a cultural issue as much as it is anything else. Customer-
focused courts think about what they can do to make the cus-
tomer experience better. With the exception of repeat players
(i.e., attorneys and parties with regular court experience),
court customers often have considerable uncertainty about the
legal process. This is particularly true of self-represented par-
ties. As a result, a high-performance court tries to reduce con-
fusion and make the process less intimidating by being readily
accessible, providing clear information, and adhering to pre-
dictable, orderly, and timely proceedings. 
Fourth, knowing whether and to what degree a court is high
performing is a matter of results. A high-performance court is
evidence based in establishing success in meeting the needs
and expectations of its constituents. Without a useful set of
performance measures, court managers are “flying blind.”
Most courts have learned to measure some things, such as the
number of incoming cases, money spent, cases disposed, or
compliance with requirements of outside agencies. But courts
should look beyond everyday operations to develop perfor-
mance measures that are aligned to the strategic plan and
vision of the court. Features to look for in performance mea-
sures are metrics derived from and related to the strategy; mea-
sures that focus on outcomes and results; measures that are
compiled frequently enough to guide decision making; mea-
sures of “team” and division performance, not just court-wide
measures; and a balanced set of measures that cover a range of
dimensions important to high-performance court success. 
The Framework’s attention to performance management
emphasizes the role of effective leadership, supportive culture,
clear customer focus, and meaningful performance measures in
creating a high-performance court. However, for a court to
make performance management more than just a collection of
management maxims, court leaders actually need to make
something happen; they need to walk the talk. Over the past
decade, the Ottawa Court has sought to embed continuous
improvement into its management practices in a formal way. Of
course, the road to continuous improvement is never straight-
forward, and Ottawa’s experience provides an opportunity to
take an in-depth look at its methods to give other court leaders
and managers a sense of the problems and roadblocks encoun-
tered as well as ideas about how to overcome them. 
20TH CIRCUIT AND OTTAWA COUNTY PROBATE
COURTS PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
In 2004, the Ottawa Court sought to enhance its perfor-
mance-management capacity through a comprehensive
process of strategic planning. As shown in Exhibit 1, it is a
mid-sized court with four circuit judges and one probate judge
handling a mix of several thousand cases.8
EXHIBIT 1: OTTAWA COUNTY
Circuit Court:
• 4 judges
• 116 full-time staff, 3 part-time staff, 18 temporary staff, 4.5
Ottawa County sheriff’s deputies, 10 intermediate-school-
district teachers (for juveniles)
• 1,511 Trial Division filings (criminal, civil, appeals) 
• 3,891 Family Division filings (domestic, juvenile, child-
protective proceedings, etc.)
• 12,000+ open Title IV-D files
• 40-bed secure juvenile-deten-
tion facility
Probate Court:
• 1 judge
• 5 full-time staff
• 1 Guardianship Review Spe-
cialist (contractual)
• 984 Probate Court filings
• 8,000+ open files
Ottawa Court leaders were aware from the outset that
strategic planning can be time consuming and cost money, and
because the court has limited resources in both areas, they
deemed it essential to make sure the effort was right for a court
of its size and situation. They decided to move forward based
on the belief that strategic planning, well executed, can pro-
vide even smaller courts an opportunity to improve their exist-
ing services as well as build capacity to sustain and expand
their services in an uncertain environment.
Strategy development is not a cookbook process; rather, it is
a challenging task that draws extensively on strategic thinking
and management. For Ottawa, the effort to do the right things
involved several traits: (a) early and active leadership from
judges and the court administrator; (b) promoting a culture
open to including staff of various levels and positions in the
planning process; (c) encouraging a strong court-wide com-
mitment to meeting the needs and expectations of court cus-
tomers; and (d) developing a set of balanced performance mea-
sures aligned with the court’s strategic goals.
LEADERSHIP 
Ottawa Court leaders introduced and developed the current
strategic plan through three complementary phases. Phase one
was establishing a strategic-planning task force made up of 20
members from different areas of the court, including judges,
administrators, mid-level supervisors, staff, and union offi-
cials. The task force was purposively designed to be inclusive
and representative of all levels of the court. The court admin-
istrator commented that “when I’ve worked with other courts
and looked at how their strategic-planning process is orga-
nized, they tend to look more like blue-ribbon teams. They are
the high-functioning, high-position people in the court. We
chose not to go in that direction . . . we have a good mix of
staff that I think keeps us grounded in the day-to-day work of
the court.” In addition, consciously spreading opportunity
throughout the court reduces any appearance of favoritism.
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In phase two, six focus-group sessions were held to gather
input from external stakeholders and court staff on identified
opportunities and priorities. In phase three, the task force
developed the content of the court’s strategic plan. This
included completing a trends analysis and an organizational
assessment, developing mission and vision statements, and
identifying five strategic-issue areas and initial strategic initia-
tives/projects.9 The strategic plan outlined the future direction
and priorities for the court and was anchored by the mission
statement: “To administer justice and restore wholeness in a
manner that inspires public trust.”
To implement the plan, the strategic-planning task force
was transformed into the Strategic Planning Oversight Team
(SPOT). SPOT has 20 members, including the chief circuit
judge, the chief probate judge, the court administrator, the
division directors (trial-division director, friend of the court,
juvenile-services director, and probate register), and a range of
line staff. This group meets three times a year to review
progress on court initiatives and when necessary adjust and
refine the strategic plan. SPOT provides guidance to five strate-
gic-issue action teams that are aligned with the five strategic-
issue areas identified in the plan. The action teams are: (1)
Resources; (2) Access to Courts; (3) Efficient/Effective Opera-
tions and Services; (4) Positive External Relations; and (5)
Employee Opportunities and Satisfaction. The action teams
meet monthly to review progress on specific programs and pro-
jects underway in their strategic area. The teams are made up
of judges, managers, and line staff and are co-chaired by mem-
bers of the SPOT team. 
SUPPORTIVE CULTURE 
Court leaders are proactive in translating the strategic plan’s
vision into action. Key to preserving the momentum of desired
change is building a court culture that promotes an open, two-
way line of communication between judges, administrators,
managers, and line staff. Through a series of regularly sched-
uled meetings and other forms of communication, everyone
working in the Ottawa Court is kept informed on the progress
of completing the latest initiatives. For example, the Court
Leadership Team, made up of the court administrator and the
division directors, meets every two weeks. For each meeting,
the strategic plan is a standing agenda item, and updates from
the five strategic-issue action teams are shared. Requiring an
update on current projects maintains a sense of urgency in staff
and creates an incentive for each of the teams to “get things
done.” Additionally, the court administrator provides updates
on the strategic plan and team initiatives to judges at the quar-
terly judges’ meetings and to all employees through emails and
the court newsletter. Finally, projects successfully completed
under the strategic plan are celebrated and showcased at the
annual all-staff meeting. The all-staff meeting is an opportunity
to recognize staff who have made significant contributions and
to recruit new members to the five strategic-issue action teams.
One member of the leadership team commented that “we do
our very best to institutionalize the plan by getting as many
people involved as reasonably possible; we want to show that
strategy is everyone’s job.”
Ultimately, there needs to be one leader with responsibility
for sustaining the effort. The point person for keeping focus on
strategic vision, plans, and initiatives in Ottawa is the court
administrator. He willingly takes the role of “champion” to pro-
mote and inform the court and the community about strategic
priorities and projects currently underway. A clearly stated goal
of senior court management is to support the opportunity for
each of the teams to develop innovative and creative initia-
tives—and to be held accountable for making progress. The
court administrator strives not to micromanage the staff. The
upside is greater trust between upper management and staff,
encouraging all employees to share ideas and take opportuni-
ties to grow in their careers. The supporting role of the court
administrator is consistent with Lao Tzu’s views on leadership:
“To lead people, walk behind them.”
The court administrator sees it as his job to assist the teams
with finding the resources they need for their initiatives or to
push them to find external resources needed to move their pro-
ject to the next level. Additionally, the court administrator
ensures that new initiatives and ideas align with the strategic
plan, and he frequently reminds staff to remember the mission
of the court. The court administrator stated that “I repeatedly
ask people to connect the dots and say how what you’re doing
advances our mission . . . . You come to work at 8:00 in the
morning, you go at it until 5:00 in the evening, you put on
your coat, and go home. But in those hours, I ask them to
reflect on what they have done today to advance the mission of
the court.”
CUSTOMER FOCUS 
The court’s strategic plan and related governance structure
chart a course for action. Within this framework, the five
strategic-issue action teams have undertaken a number of ini-
tiatives that have helped advance the court’s mission over the
last decade. A primary focus of these efforts is on improving
customer satisfaction. The Ottawa Court has embraced this
view and seeks to organize administrative practices to deliver
high-quality services to all individuals who enter the court-
house doors. Court customers react to both the services deliv-
ered and the manner of delivery. As a result, courts want to
ensure that they are both readily accessible and exhibit fair
processes in all court proceedings. Moreover, people want the
process to be clear and well-designed. That is, they want the
process to convey a logical, rational connection between key
events and end with a definitive outcome.
In the Ottawa Court, a strong customer focus guided the
strategic-planning process from the outset. At first, many of
the projects were smaller in scope and did not require a great
deal of effort or resources. For example, obtaining new and
better signage in the courthouses cost the court virtually noth-
ing but was viewed very favorably by the public. By starting
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This article provides a complete overview of the development of
the court’s strategic plan. 
smaller, the court was able to meet some objectives right away
and give the plan added momentum moving forward. 
As the plan gained support, the action teams took on larger
tasks with the associated challenge of obtaining the necessary
resources. Highlights from each team include:
• Team 1 (Resources) successfully partnered with local uni-
versities to establish a volunteer internship program. Draw-
ing on unpaid interns (they receive college credit) proved a
cost-effective way to help stay current with workload by
covering duties of vacant staff positions during the fiscal
bad times. Some of the tasks the interns perform for the
court include maintaining case files, data collection, and
data entry. In addition, the intern program serves as a way
to provide relevant work experience, build specific skills,
and identify top candidates when positions for full-time
employees in the court come open. On average, the court
has about 10 interns. 
• Team 2 (Access to Courts) has deployed the CourTools
Access and Fairness Survey (Measure 1) on two separate
occasions to evaluate court-customer views on the accessi-
bility of services and the fairness of decision-making proce-
dures. It provides relevant feedback to court leaders on
whether people believe the court is “doing the right things.”
This instrument measures individual satisfaction with the
ability to make use of the court’s dispute-resolution services
(access) and how the legal process dealt with their issue,
interest, or case (fairness). Additionally, the team took the
lead on one of the court’s most significant projects, the
development of a legal self-help center.
• Team 3 (Efficient/Effective Operations and Services) devel-
oped a technology master plan designed to assess what tech-
nology the court was using at the time and to identify areas
for potential improvement within each division. Document
imaging proved to be the highest strategic priority and, with
support from Team 1, the team was eventually able to secure
federal funding to support implementation of the project.
• Team 4 (Positive External Relations) established an annual
bench/bar meeting. Part of the court’s public outreach is to
strengthen bonds with local attorneys by more effectively
sharing information on new developments (e.g., drug
courts) and furthering discussion over possible revisions to
current court policies and practices. In addition, Team 4
organizes an annual juvenile-related community program,
referred to as the PACK meeting (Professionals Advocating
and Caring for Kids). This effort brings together the courts,
law enforcement, schools, treatment providers, and more to
discuss programming issues and topics of mutual concern
regarding at-risk youth. Most recently, Team 4 organized the
first Domestic Law Summit as a more targeted bench/bar
meeting for family-law practitioners.
• Team 5 (Employee Opportunities and Satisfaction) has used
the CourTools Employee Satisfaction Survey (Measure 9)
and worked with senior management to provide free pro-
fessional-development opportunities for staff. A couple of
examples of these opportunities include a “Lunch and
Learn” series covering a variety of topics chosen from
employee-survey results, and several work-related skill-
building sessions offered by the County Human Resources
Department. This team also assisted court leadership in
design considerations for a new courthouse built in Grand
Haven, as well as upgrades in the Fillmore and Holland
locations. 
A closer look at two specific initiatives illustrates the court’s
skillful use of performance management to enact change.
Development of a Legal Self-Help Center. In 2009, Team 2
(Access to Courts) began work on the development of a legal
self-help center to fill a perceived gap in litigant services. At
the time, many cases were being adjourned as a result of pro
per litigants filing incorrect or incomplete motions (e.g.,
motion to modify child support; motion to modify custody).
While court staff was able to provide forms to civil and probate
pro per litigants, they were often too busy to fully answer ques-
tions and were prohibited from providing any legal advice. In
response, staff members of Team 2 attended national trainings
and began researching what other jurisdictions had done to
successfully set up a legal self-help center. Collaborating with
staff from Team 1 (Resources), external-funding sources were
found, and grant funding for a part-time position was secured.
Staff then spent several months getting operations up and run-
ning, including obtaining access to computers, recruiting, and
training volunteers (e.g., law students and paralegals) for the
center, and developing forms and packets for different types of
motions (e.g., initial divorce pleadings). The legal self-help
center opened at the Ottawa County Courthouse in Grand
Haven in January 2010. 
After opening, the program kept detailed statistics about the
number and types of users (e.g., gender, race, military service,
income level, and education), reasons for contact, and the
types of services provided by the self-help center. Buttressed by
these analytics, the court was able to successfully show the
county board of commissioners the value of the center and
subsequently received funding for a full-time director. The
court administrator stated that “now when people come in
unprepared and uncertain about what paperwork they need or
what to do, staff will say, ‘go down the hall to the self-help cen-
ter, talk to the people there, and come back as soon as you’re
ready.’ This has had a dramatic, positive impact on litigants and
the court’s docket.” In recent years, the legal self-help center
has expanded to provide free services at two additional court
locations in the county. The self-help center is able to provide
assistance to pro per litigants who wish to resolve a variety of
non-criminal matters, including child support, paternity,
divorce, guardianship, conservatorship, estates, small claims,
landlord/tenant, and garnishment. Since 2010, the number of
individuals using the center has doubled.
Employee Satisfaction. The current strategic plan places an
emphasis on creating a healthy work environment with
engaged and satisfied employees, the idea being that employee
attitudes shape the culture of the court. In the area of customer
service, employees committed to the mission are important
because they are the face of the court to the public. Research
suggests that satisfaction is related to the extent to which
employees feel passionate about their jobs, embrace the vision
and values, and put discretionary effort into their work. Satis-
fied employees are motivated to do more than the bare mini-
mum needed to keep their jobs. 
110 Court Review - Volume 51 
10. Further details regarding BBS are available at
www.ncsc.org/~/media/files/pdf/education%20and%20careers/ced
p%20papers/2011/building%20bench%20strength%20-%20suc-
cession%20planning%20readiness.ashx.
11. The CourTools Employee Satisfaction Survey was significantly
modified in 2011. Exhibit 2 displays the survey questions that
were similar in content between 2007 and 2013.
12. Q1=I am kept informed about matters that affect me in my work-
place; Q2=The Court is respected in the community; Q3=I under-
stand how my job contributes to the overall mission of the Court;
Q4=I am treated with respect; Q5=When I do my job well, I am
likely to be recognized and thanked by my supervisor; Q6=My
working conditions and environment enable me to do my job
well; Q7=I feel valued by my supervisor based on my knowledge
and contribution to my department, unit, or division; Q8=I enjoy
coming to work; Q9=The people I work with take a personal
interest in me; Q10=I have the resources necessary to do my job
well; Q11=On my job, I know exactly what is expected of me;
Q12=I am proud that I work at the Court; Q13=Communication
within my division is good; Q14=My co-workers work well
together; Q15=I have opportunities to express my opinion about
how things are done in my division; Q16=In the last 6 months, a
supervisor/manager has talked with me about my
performance/career development.
To gauge how employees of the court perceive their work-
place, Team 5 (Employee Opportunities and Satisfaction) drew
on the CourTools Employee Satisfaction Survey (Measure 9).
The survey was first used in 2007, establishing a baseline of sat-
isfaction levels and pinpointing specific issues for the strategic-
issue action team to focus on (e.g., keeping staff informed about
matters that affect them in the workplace). Repeated deploy-
ment in 2009, 2011, and 2013 allowed the court to evaluate the
impact of strategic interventions and refined work practices.
Although most employees won’t turn down a raise, the
Ottawa Court, like courts everywhere, operates within a tight
budget. So while the team worked to update the wage scale and
employee classifications, court leaders also looked hard to find
less expensive changes that could improve employee engage-
ment. The employee-satisfaction survey identified five areas
that court leaders have tried to address: communication, per-
formance evaluation, flexibility, staff support and recognition,
and training. Since 2007, the court has undertaken a number
of initiatives to increase employee engagement. For example,
the court has worked to enhance communication about court
policies, practices, and activities by hosting an annual all-staff
meeting, developing newsletters and court blogs, and estab-
lishing several committees to assist in the sharing of informa-
tion (e.g., Labor Management Cooperation Committee; Train-
ing Committee; Wage and Classification Committee). Addi-
tionally, the court has developed one consistent performance-
evaluation tool for all staff and has hosted picnics, potlucks,
and holiday parties.
Furthermore, court leaders recognize that employees appre-
ciate more control over their schedules. Therefore, the court
has made flextime an option. Many employees have demand-
ing schedules outside of work and value a boss who considers
work-life balance. Court leaders also take time to celebrate
success and recognize staff accomplishments. The chief judge
noted that celebrating wins reminds everyone of the goal that
was set and why it was set in the first place. Plus it reminds
everyone that the court’s strategic-planning process works. The
regular meetings of the Strategic Planning Oversight Team and
the annual all-staff meeting provide multiple opportunities to
motivate staff to continue good work, connect with coworkers
in a way that is not just work related, and reward specific
employees who have gone above and beyond.
The court also invests in employee growth by providing
training and encouraging staff to learn new skills. The court has
embraced staff development through multiple training avenues,
including support of staff for ongoing education through the
Institute for Court Management (ICM) and allowing staff to
receive Leadership Gold and 4 C’s (customer service, commu-
nication, continuous improvement, cultural intelligence) train-
ing.  In fact, the talent development and talent management of
court employees was the subject of a joint ICM Fellowship
research project conducted by three members of the court-lead-
ership team. This research project culminated in the develop-
ment and implementation of “Building Bench Strength” (BBS) as
a new court initiative to support the professional development
of staff and to ensure the court has “the right people with the
right skills in the right place at the right time.”10
The benefits to staff morale from these efforts can be seen in
a comparison of survey results from 2007 and 2013 (see
Exhibit 2).11 For example, responses to Q1 (I am kept
informed about matters that affect me in my workplace), Q9
(the people I work with take a personal interest in me), Q10 (I
have the resources necessary to do my job well), and Q11 (on
my job, I know exactly what is expected of me) have all sig-
nificantly increased. Despite these improvements, Team 5 con-
tinues to develop a number of specific recommendations for
improved employee satisfaction. Recent recommendations
include considering the development of standardized elec-
tronic training materials that are tied to each division’s policy-
and-procedure manual and a commitment to using existing
training dollars to send more front-line staff to outside train-
ings.
EXHIBIT 2: A COMPARISON OF EMPLOYEE-
SATISFACTION SURVEY RESULTS: 2007 TO 201312
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1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree
current practices and to help court leaders identify specific areas
where they believe they are doing well or areas where they believe
improvement is needed. 
13. The purpose of the High Performance Court Self-Assessment sur-
vey is to familiarize a court with the success factors associated
with becoming a high-performance court in relation to its own
PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
The Ottawa Court has made a strong commitment to use
performance-related data to manage and improve its opera-
tions. Performance data allows for an empirical, non-anecdotal
assessment of whether established goals are being reasonably
achieved and which areas are in need of improvement. The
court has actively made use of performance data to investigate
the effectiveness of strategic-planning initiatives, to assess and
refine case-management practices, and to meet the require-
ments for budget submissions to the Michigan State Court
Administrative Office (SCAO). 
Ottawa is currently evaluating its use of performance mea-
sures to support quality improvement within the court (inter-
nal quality improvement) as well as determining what to share
with the public through the Ottawa County website (external
quality reporting). As part of its continuous improvement
efforts, the court periodically assesses the measures it uses for
internal quality improvement using three basic steps: 1) iden-
tify problems or opportunities for improvement; 2) select
appropriate measures of these areas; and 3) obtain a baseline
assessment of current practices and then re-measure to assess
the effect of improvement efforts on measured performance. By
annually revisiting its performance criteria in conjunction with
budget preparation, the court can gauge whether measures
remain in line with strategic goals and if not, set new mea-
surement priorities as part of the strategic plan.
The court’s interest in developing a public dashboard for
external reporting corresponded with a 2012 SCAO statewide
initiative: “Courts Working Smarter for a Better Michigan.”
The initiative called for all Michigan courts to identify perfor-
mance measures, set goals, and post performance results on
public dashboards. To meet this directive, the court chose to
align its efforts with the principles of the High Performance
Court Framework and sought direct assistance from the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC). The goal of the pro-
ject was to design and implement a balanced scorecard
approach to performance measurement that linked to the
court’s strategic priorities and ongoing improvement efforts.
The court looked to develop a comprehensive performance
dashboard to use in monitoring and maintaining the provision
of high-quality judicial services to citizens and litigants. To
provide guidance and direction to this project, the court
formed the Ottawa High Performance Court Committee
(OHPCC), comprised of individuals representing each division
of the 20th Circuit Court (Trial Division, Friend of the Court,
and Juvenile Services), the Ottawa County Probate Court, the
58th District Court, and the Ottawa County Clerk’s Office. The
purpose of the OHPCC was to work directly with the NCSC
team to review existing performance indicators, assess data
availability and quality, clarify internal and external require-
ments, and develop a comprehensive performance dashboard.
As a first step, NCSC staff used the High Performance Court
Self-Assessment survey to gather perspectives on the effective-
ness of current court operations from judges, managers, super-
visors, and line staff working in the different divisions of the
district, circuit, and probate courts and the clerk’s office.13 The
survey results help court leaders identify specific areas where
they believe they are successful, as well as identify targets for
improvement. 
The survey results showcased a number of areas of per-
ceived strengths. Throughout the court, respondents said the
organization was successful in many aspects of strategic man-
agement, including clear commitment to treating all court
users with courtesy and respect; actively looking for ways to
better meet customer needs (e.g., self-help center); regular
opportunities for staff to express their opinions about how
things are done in their division; meaningful ways for staff to
participate in shaping and improving processes and proce-
dures; and widespread belief that court leaders effectively man-
age the organizational changes needed to improve court
administrative practices. It is notable that these viewpoints
reflect a shared understanding and agreement among all
employees with the values articulated in the strategic plan.
On the other hand, the survey results also identified oppor-
tunities for improvement. In evaluating current court-manage-
ment practices, lower survey scores were largely attached to
issues around performance measurement, including: ensuring
a report on performance measures is a regular item on the
agenda at judges’ meetings; creating opportunities for struc-
tured discussion on how best to use performance results to
improve caseflow-management practices; conducting periodic
training for all court personnel and judicial officers in case-
management practices; providing staff education and training
in court-performance monitoring, analysis, and management;
willingness to share court-wide what has been done to improve
performance and refine practices; and making select perfor-
mance-measurement results available on the court website.
The survey results were shared with OHPCC and provided
a platform for discussion about the court’s current use of per-
formance measures, alignment of measures with strategic
goals, and how best to use performance information to support
decision making. Additionally, the results confirmed an inter-
est of court personnel to focus on the external dissemination
of performance results. Finally, getting systematic input from
both judges and court staff at the outset has helped solidify
agreement over the direction the court will go with perfor-
mance information for internal and external audiences.
SUMMING UP 
At West Point, Army cadets study tactical thrusts and strate-
gic plans, the small-scale movements and the big picture.
Court leaders face something similar, a balance between tactics
and strategy. Tactics are the how, while strategy is the where,
when, and why. Taking time to focus on strategy is essential to
choosing a good path through what can be a confusing
labyrinth. Thinking back, the Ottawa court administrator said,
“Our approach to strategic planning has emphasized a few key
elements. We’ve tried to communicate openly and often, we
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support stretch goals and giving people the opportunity to
work to their potential, and then I get out of the way. Ulti-
mately, it comes down to trusting the teams.”
LESSONS LEARNED 
In 2014, the Ottawa Court marked a 10-year anniversary in
its use of strategic planning. There’s widespread belief through-
out the court that its plan is working and leading to meaning-
ful improvement in how the Ottawa Court does business.
What’s its secret? When asked, judicial and court administra-
tive leaders were able to boil down what’s worked for them into
a set of seven lessons learned. The ongoing relevance of strate-
gic planning to court operations is clear in that they are about
to begin updating and implementing a new three-year plan.
1. The culture needs to support and sustain the plan. As
stated by the chief judge, “It became obvious to me that while
the initial decision to engage in strategic planning needed to be
pushed by an individual, if it was going to succeed, the effort
needed to move from being personality driven to being insti-
tutionalized and part of our culture.” To do that, the court has
sought wide and diverse staff participation in all phases of the
planning process. In particular, court leadership has been visi-
ble and actively involved not only in setting the vision but in
all implementation and oversight phases. Having the bench
engaged is essential to the success of strategic planning. When
judges see and believe in the benefits of a plan, they can help
“sell it” to the rest of the court staff. Also, the five action teams
are made up of court staff on many levels, giving them a voice
in the process. The creation of teams and sub-teams provides
many opportunities to participate, helping the rationale and
need for the plan to percolate down through all levels of the
organization. The result is that the court has created a culture
with top-down support and bottom-up ideas and initiative.
2. Be willing to invest the necessary time. All court leaders
stressed that, as one judge put it, “You have to be willing to put
in time up front and keep your eyes on the prize over the long
haul.” At the outset, time is needed to design the content of the
plan, assign responsibilities, develop a communication plan,
and prepare judges and staff for putting the plan in place. The
court administrator stated that, once the process got rolling, “I
needed to devote time to my role as coordinator to keep enthu-
siasm up, keep forward momentum on different projects, and
continually remind everyone that what they’re doing with
these strategic-planning projects is key to how we fulfill the
overall mission of the court.” Successful change doesn’t hap-
pen overnight. The chief judge went on to say that he thinks it
took about four years for strategic management to become the
way the Ottawa Court does things:
In the first year, many employees are thinking, “What
is a strategic plan anyway? I don’t even understand what
that is.” As projects started to move in the second year, it
became more personal, and we had employees asking,
“What is it going to mean to me? Does it mean I have to
work harder or differently? Will I be negatively impacted
by this?” And then by the third year, people saw we were
serious, they knew about the action teams and that things
were happening. They saw people being recognized for
their involvement and projects coming to fruition. They
saw people being promoted because, among other things,
they have on their resumé that they were involved in the
strategic-planning process. Names become known to
judges and upper-level management for the work that
they’ve done on various projects. And then, in the fourth
year you have folks saying, “Hey, how about I get
involved in that?” Or, “I’ll volunteer to participate.”
3. Make it real. A first step was to produce a written plan
and make it easily accessible on the website by anyone, includ-
ing the public and staff. One judge noted, “When you make
the plan public, you’re saying, ‘Here’s who we are, here’s what
we think is important, and here’s what we pledge to do.’” From
this position, court leaders have sought to create ownership
among staff by giving the teams real authority, support, and
resources to put the plan into action. The chief judge said it
this way: “I don’t want them to try to guess how I think it
should be done. I want to give them real discretion to do what
they think is right, and I’ll support them as long as it is not an
abuse of discretion.” His last point confirms that, in the Ottawa
Court, discretion comes with accountability. A mix of monthly
team meetings, SPOT meetings every four months, and the
annual all-staff meeting ensure there are regular progress
reports and timely feedback. As stated by the court adminis-
trator, “You can tell who’s doing the work and who’s not doing
the work. And nobody wants to appear as though they’re not
doing the work.” The other side of the accountability coin is
recognition. The regular meeting schedule also provides many
opportunities to reward and recognize tasks accomplished and
promote self-motivation. A judge summed it up, “We want to
be sure staff is not toiling in obscurity and that they’re recog-
nized for their participation and successes.” 
4. Set attainable goals. While, not surprisingly, the projects
carried out under the auspices of strategic planning should
meet strategic priorities, they should also be attainable. Resolv-
ing the tension between good ideas and budget realities is
imperative. A judge stated that, “Sometimes we dream big, but
we just can’t make it happen—that is particularly true for get-
ting money for new positions.” While big ideas can work out
(e.g., the legal self-help center), the Ottawa Court also builds in
some quick-success scenarios like better signage, a book drive
for the juvenile-detention center, and a recycling program for
the courthouse that don’t cost a lot of money but still carry
value. Relatedly, because there is a lot of energy and excitement
for the strategic-planning effort, Ottawa Court leaders try to
avoid undue delay (and associated frustration) by deciding in a
timely way whether projects that require more substantial fund-
ing will get the green light. They are also creative in generating
outside support for good ideas.  For example, the courthouse
where probate cases are handled was retrofitted to have a bar-
rier-free entrance wide enough to accommodate a wheelchair,
yet it initially lacked a button to automatically open the door.
People in wheelchairs were unable to open the door themselves
and were forced to wait outside until someone else opened the
door. On multiple occasions, the court’s request for funding to
install a button was denied by the board of supervisors (a cost
of roughly $5,000). When the court conducted the CourTools
Access and Fairness survey, many court users lodged com-
plaints about the physical facilities, including handicap access.
The public feedback proved persuasive, and the automatic-door
button was funded and installed by the county.
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5. Bring in an experienced outside facilitator to jumpstart
the process. The court found using an outside consultant to
help with the creation of the original strategic plan to be
extremely beneficial. An individual with expertise in strategic
planning brings fresh perspective. He or she can provide best
practices in how to structure an effective meeting and offer
immediate clarity on the organizational principles needed to
craft a mission statement and develop an action plan. 
6. Explicitly link projects and practices to the mission
statement. Ottawa Court leadership want all personnel to
understand the big picture embodied in the court’s mission
statement and how that guides how work gets done. In addi-
tion, the mission needs to be translated to the county board of
commissioners as the funding unit, and court leaders must
make sure they understand that the whole budget process is
tied to the strategic plan. The court administrator put it this
way: “I keep asking the action team leaders and team members
how does each proposed project relate to being able to better
serve the public. If you can’t draw a straight line from what
you’re doing to how it’s serving the mission of the court, you
need to stop doing it and do something different.” 
7. Look at the big picture. There is no one best way or pre-
cise path for courts to follow to achieve higher performance.
Success depends on navigating and working within the local
budgetary, political, and cultural environment. Yet the daily
press of business is real, and it is easy to lose sight of the for-
est when trees are burning. A key value of strategic planning is
to encourage administrative leaders to periodically step back
from operational issues and putting out fires to address long-
term strategy. The High Performance Court Framework sup-
ports these efforts to see the big picture and helps ensure that
a court’s strategic and action plans are comprehensive, recog-
nize the role of existing organizational culture and capacity,
focus on customers, and support the effective use and com-
munication of performance results. That is, the Framework is
designed to help courts plan how they can achieve and sustain
quality in the administration of justice. The chief judge
summed up the rationale for strategic planning when he stated
that without a plan, “you’re vulnerable to criticism. Unless you
have a plan, you’re going to bounce around on the sea of life
like so much flotsam and jetsam responding to the current and
the winds. And once you have a plan, you can hold your head
up and say, ‘we’re not just reacting to life here, we are actually
moving forward in a planned and orderly fashion.’ And I just
think that makes everybody feel better about what they’re
doing and the organization they work for.”
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(1995). After a Florida jury acquitted Hispanic neighborhood-
watch coordinator George Zimmerman of second-degree-murder
and manslaughter charges in the death of unarmed black teen
Trayvon Martin, one outspoken juror explained her reasoning in
the case to the media. She said she had “no doubt” that Zimmer-
man “feared for his life” in his encounter with Martin and that
“anybody would think anybody walking down the road, stopping
and turning and looking—if that’s exactly what [Martin did]—is
suspicious.” Scientists and legal scholars have concluded that
On August 9, 2014, white police officer Darren Wilsonshot an unarmed black civilian named Michael Brown.In the wake of the extensive media coverage and pub-
lic scrutiny that followed, the tragic incident triggered a federal
civil-rights investigation and renewed a broader national dia-
logue about the perception of black males as inherently dan-
gerous, threatening, or criminal—and the role of those percep-
tions in perpetuating racial inequality in the United States.1 A
grand jury decision not to indict Wilson on murder charges
elicited highly polarized reactions from the general public,
which ranged from wholehearted support for Officer Wilson to
further accusations of racial bias against the prosecutor in the
case and against the predominantly white grand jury charged
with making the decision.2 The President of the United States
addressed the diverse sentiments of the American people: 
There are Americans who agree with it [the Ferguson
grand jury decision] and there are Americans who are
deeply disappointed—even angry. . . . We have made
enormous progress in race relations over the course of the
past several decades. I have witnessed that in my own life,
and to deny that progress, I think, is to deny America’s
capacity for change. But what is also true is that there are
still problems—and communities of color aren’t just mak-
ing these problems up. Separating that from this particu-
lar decision, there are issues in which the law too often
feels as if it is being applied in a discriminatory fashion.3
On March 4, 2015, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) released a report of findings in its investigation of the
Ferguson, Missouri, criminal-justice system. The report con-
tributed to the still-growing body of literature acknowledging
contemporary racial inequality and recognizing that these dis-
parities may not be explained on the basis of people’s explicit,
intentional biases alone. In the report, the DOJ described evi-
dence of systematic racial discrimination in the community’s
policing and municipal court practices. Observed disparities in
treatment were “unexplainable on grounds other than race and
evidence that racial bias, whether implicit or explicit, has
shaped law enforcement conduct,” resulting in what they con-
cluded to be disproportionate harm to Ferguson’s African-
American residents.4 In discussing the DOJ report, Attorney
General Eric Holder described Ferguson as “a community
where this harm frequently appears to stem, at least in part,
from racial bias—both implicit and explicit.”5
Although the possible effects of implicit bias on justice-sys-
tem outcomes should be considered at each decision point in
case processing, we focus in this article on the potential effects
of implicit bias in the decision making of everyday American
citizens who are randomly selected to serve on grand juries
and in jury trials. We begin with a brief explanation of the con-
cept of implicit bias and examine one type of intervention that
some believe could address this subtler form of racial bias in
jury decision making: a specialized jury instruction. 
IMPLICIT BIAS AND ITS ROLE IN JUROR DECISION
MAKING
In understanding how racial bias can continue to operate in
the context of the modern American jury, one must account for
both forms of racial bias identified by the Attorney General and
by the DOJ in the Ferguson report. This includes explicit bias,
the form of bias that a person intentionally endorses (and the
traditional definition of racial prejudice that most people rec-
ognize), but also implicit bias, a form of bias that occurs when
a person makes associations between a group of people and par-
ticular traits that then operate without self-awareness to affect
one’s perception of, understanding of, judgment about, or
behavior toward others.6 People develop these associations (i.e.,
attitudes and stereotypes) between particular social groups and
particular qualities (for example, one study showed that many
participants implicitly associate “black” with “guilty,” and other
Implicit Bias and the American Juror
Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor
116 Court Review - Volume 51  
legal decision makers “are often unaware of the extent to which
implicit racial bias can influence perceptions of fear and reason-
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George Zimmerman Feared for His Life, CNN, July 16, 2013, avail-
able at http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-juror-
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(2012).
13. Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effec-
tiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 DUKE L.J. 167 (2012).
14. Judicial Conference Criminal Jury Instructions, CALCRIM No.
101 (2013).
15. Specifically on burden of proof and relevant caselaw; e.g., Jeffrey
E. Pfeifer & James Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A
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16. See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Mak-
ing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW &
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whether jury instructions were present or absent from the
research design.
17. Danielle M. Young et al., Innocent until Primed: Mock Jurors’
studies have shown associations between African-Americans
and negative characteristics such as aggression and hostility) as
they learn from their social environment (e.g., media, parental,
or peer role models).7 The influence of these attitudes or stereo-
types in producing a discriminatory response may occur invol-
untarily and without a person’s conscious intent. That is, indi-
viduals may explicitly report egalitarian racial attitudes but can
nevertheless still make racially biased decisions and behave in
racially biased ways.8
Findings in the scientific research literature demonstrate
how implicit bias can operate to distort a person’s interpreta-
tions of the evidence in a case. Racial stereotypes have been
found to play a role in how people perceive and interpret oth-
erwise ambiguous events. For example, one study found that
people interpret ambiguously hostile behavior as more hostile
when performed by a black compared with a white actor.9 Sim-
ilarly, people who test high on implicit racial bias were found
to be more likely to interpret ambiguous expressions in a neg-
ative manner (i.e., as angrier) on black faces (but not white
faces) compared with those who test low on implicit racial
bias.10 Another recent study found that presenting mock
jurors with images of darker-skinned (compared to lighter-
skinned) perpetrators biased their interpretations of ambigu-
ous evidence. Biased interpretations of the evidence, in turn,
predicted subsequent guilty verdicts.11
ADDRESSING IMPLICIT BIAS WITH JURORS
In recent years, court leaders across the country have rec-
ognized the challenge posed by implicit forms of bias and have
focused on addressing this issue in the criminal-justice system
through in-depth education and training of judges and court
staff.12 However, unlike with judges and court staff, the courts
have limited opportunities to educate jurors about the perni-
cious effects of complex psychological phenomena like
implicit bias. Most jurors in this country serve only for the
duration of a trial (typically two to three days) and then are
released from service. There is no time available during this
short period to provide the type of in-depth education that
judges and court staff may receive on strategies to reduce the
impact of implicit bias in their decision making. Other solu-
tions that might operate effectively in other settings are not
always feasible for use in jury trials, where these time con-
straints and additional resource limitations (e.g., funding,
staffing, technology) often prohibit more elaborate interven-
tions. For primarily practical reasons, courts have historically
relied on jury instructions to guide juror decision making.13
Presently, pattern jury instructions developed for use in state
and federal jury trials typically rely on the simple admonition
that jurors should not let “bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public
opinion influence [their] decision.”14 Only a few studies have
attempted to explore the utility of standard pattern jury instruc-
tions, but they have produced mixed findings.15 Specifically,
one meta-analysis of 16 mock-juror studies (a) found that mock
jurors were likely to “render longer sentences for other-race
defendants,” (b) found that racial bias in these mock-juror
studies was “more pronounced . . . for Black participants; when
community members were participants; and in published stud-
ies,” but (c) concluded that racial bias in mock juror verdicts
“decrease[d] when ecologically relevant procedures [were]
used.”16 Alternatively, one recent study showed that pattern
presumption-of-innocence instructions, “a core legal principle
specifically designed to eliminate bias,” actually primed greater
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24. Young et al., supra note 17.
25. See pages 113-114 for the specialized jury instruction used in this
experiment. We have annotated the experimental instruction we
tested, citing the existing scientific research evidence that formed
the theoretical basis for each of the components of the instruction.
26. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Court-
attention to race (i.e., to attend more to black individuals)
among mock jurors compared to an alternative matched-length
instruction.17 This type of attentional bias, in which decision-
makers focus more of their visual attention on black individu-
als, has been shown in other research to lead to racially biased
interpretations of events and racially biased decisions.18 When
considering this mixed evidence in combination with (a)
research indicating that people may not be able to consciously
correct for the effect(s) of their implicit biases because they are
often unaware that these biases exist and (b) evidence of racial
discrimination in actual jury trials, standard legal instructions
do not appear to offer a complete or reliable solution.19
As a next step, to address concerns of both implicit and
explicit racial bias among jurors, some judges and lawyers
have expressed interest in developing a specialized jury
instruction, with at least one midwestern district court judge
(now retired) having already used a specialized jury instruc-
tion on implicit bias at trial.20 Crafting clear, effective jury
instructions on the topic of implicit bias, however, requires
extensive subject-matter expertise for two main reasons. First,
subject-matter expertise is necessary to ensure that the lan-
guage and strategies used in the instruction are accurate
reflections of the state of the science. The high level of sub-
ject-matter expertise necessary to leverage lessons learned
from existing research and provide jurors with appropriate
debiasing strategies may not be available among the law-
trained professionals who typically comprise committees that
draft pattern jury instructions. Second, subject-matter exper-
tise is also needed to ensure that the developed instruction
intervention does not incorporate communication strategies
known to exacerbate expressions of racial bias in certain sub-
populations. For example, strategies that impress an extrinsic
motivation to be non-prejudiced (i.e., mandates and other
authoritarian language typical of jury instructions) may pro-
voke hostility and resistance from some individuals, failing to
reduce and perhaps even exacerbating expressions of preju-
dice.21 Instead, communications designed to foster intrinsic
egalitarian motivations may more effectively reduce both
explicit and implicit expressions of prejudice without eliciting
such backfire or backlash effects.22 These and other research
findings are important to consider for those looking to adopt
a jury instruction to minimize expressions of implicit biases
in juror judgment.
Any new jury instruction should be carefully evaluated to
determine its actual impact on decision making before broadly
promoting the instruction as a solution for general use in the
courtroom. Jury instructions designed to achieve specific cog-
nitive processing or decision-making objectives are not always
a completely effective solution, as has been well documented
in prior studies on instructions to disregard inadmissible evi-
dence.23 Empirical scrutiny is particularly important with any
jury instruction on implicit biases given the possibility that a
specialized instruction (a) may successfully reduce expres-
sions of racial bias with some jurors yet exacerbate expressions
of bias in others and/or (b) may serve to increase juror atten-
tion to race in a way that might increase the likelihood of
biased outcomes.24 To date, no known studies have examined
the efficacy of a specialized jury instruction informed by the
research on reducing implicit forms of bias. 
IMPLICIT-BIAS JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A MOCK-JUROR
EXPERIMENT
In the present study, we examined for the first time the effi-
cacy of a specialized jury instruction in reducing racial dispari-
ties in juror judgments.  The National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) consulted with nationally recognized social-science and
legal experts on implicit bias to develop a specialized jury
instruction for use in a web-based experiment with jury-eligible
U.S. citizens.25 In the study, NCSC adapted a trial scenario from
a seminal research study that had effectively demonstrated racial
bias in juror decision making (an effect which has since been
replicated in several experiments using similar if not identical
research methodologies). The trial scenario featured a defendant
who was charged with assault and battery with intent to cause
serious bodily injury. The defendant and victim were described
as teammates on a college basketball team, and the alleged
assault resulted from a locker-room fight. Prior studies showed
that white jurors tended to judge black defendants more harshly
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Our Experimental Implicit-Bias Jury Instruction, Annotated1
Our system of justice depends on the willingness and ability of judges like me and jurors like you to make careful andfair decisions.2 What we are asked to do is difficult because of a universal challenge: We all have biases. We each makeassumptions and have our own stereotypes, prejudices, and fears.3 These biases can influence how we categorize the
information we take in.4 They can influence the evidence we see and hear, and how we perceive a person or a situation. They
can affect the evidence we remember and how we remember it. And they can influence the “gut feelings” and conclusions we
form about people and events.5 When we are aware of these biases, we can at least try to fight them.6 But we are often not
aware that they exist.  
We can only correct for hidden biases when we recognize them and how they affect us. For this reason, you are encouraged
to thoroughly and carefully examine your decision-making process to ensure that the conclusions you draw are a fair reflec-
tion of the law and the evidence.7 Please examine your reasoning for possible bias by reconsidering your first impressions of
the people and evidence in this case. Is it easier to believe statements or evidence when presented by people who are more like
you?8 If you or the people involved in this case were from different backgrounds—richer or poorer, more or less educated,
older or younger, or of a different gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation—would you still view them, and the evidence,
the same way?9
Please also listen to the other jurors during deliberations, who may be from different backgrounds and who will be viewing
this case in light of their own insights, assumptions, and even biases.10 Listening to different perspectives may help you to bet-
ter identify the possible effects these hidden biases may have on decision-making.11
Our system of justice relies on each of us to contribute toward a fair and informed verdict in this case. Working together,
we can reach a fair result.12
Footnotes 
1. We reprint here the specialized jury instruction used in the pre-
sent experiment, along with citations to the existing scientific
research evidence that formed the theoretical basis for each of
the instruction’s components. However, we are not suggesting
nor do we recommend that any court proceed to adopt this
instruction without further empirical testing to determine the
efficacy of this or any other instruction designed to address
implicit and explicit forms of bias in juror decision making.
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3. To avoid potential backfire effects, instructional language
should reduce external pressure to comply (by avoiding author-
itarian language) and promote intrinsic motivation to counter-
act biases (E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses to
Other-Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J.
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SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1998); Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators
White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG.
STUDIES 886 (2010). On the effects of bias on perception and
judgment, and regarding how awareness of potential bias may
help trigger self-correction efforts, see Alexander R. Green et al.,
Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231 (2007). 
6. People often are not aware of their own biases. For people to
attempt to correct for bias, they must know that it is a problem
and also believe the problem to be self-relevant (see Timothy D.
Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Cor-
rection: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116
PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994); see also Duane T. Wegener et al.,
Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments: Implications for Jury
Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 629 (2000); Duane T.
Wegener & Richard E. Petty, Flexible Correction Processes in
Social Judgment: The Role of Naive Theories in Corrections for Per-
ceived Bias, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (1995); Duane
T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Connection Model:
The Role of Naive Theories in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141 (Mark P. Zanna ed.,
1997)). 
7. A more deliberative mode of thinking may help to reduce
expressions of bias (see Ellen Langer et al., Decreasing Prejudice
by Increasing Discrimination, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
113 (1985); Maja Djikic et al., Reducing Stereotyping Through
Mindfulness: Effects on Automatic Stereotype-Activated Behaviors,
15 J. ADULT DEV. 106 (2008); see also Guthrie et al., supra note
4; Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R. P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt
Determinations: A Modern Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1713 (1991)). 
8. For a discussion on processing fluency and perceptions of trust,
see Rolf Reber & Norbert Schwarz, Effects of Perceptual Fluency
on Judgments of Truth, 8 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 338
(1999); Adam L. Alter & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Uniting the
Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation, 13 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. (2009). See also Russell D. Clark & Anne
Maass, Social Categorization in Minority Influence: The Case of
Homosexuality, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 347 (1988), Masaki
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room: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000).
27. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An
Investigation of Prejudice against Black Defendants in the American
Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 215 (2001); but see
Mitchell et al., supra note 16.
28. Mock jurors who received the control instruction evaluated the
strength of the defense’s case in subtly different ways from partic-
ipants who received the specialized instruction. Specifically, no
differences were observed between conditions when the trial sce-
nario described the victim as white. Similarly, for participants who
received the specialized instruction, no differences were observed
than white defendants.26 Authors of those studies concluded
that the race of the victim may not be a critical factor in the
expression of this “white juror bias,” but other research suggests
otherwise.27 To account for this possibility, NCSC varied the race
of both the victim and the defendant across experimental condi-
tions of the trial scenario. NCSC also created a video of a trial
judge giving instructions on the applicable law, which included
either the specialized implicit-bias jury instruction or an alter-
native instruction of approximately equal length (creating
matched control groups for comparison purposes).
NCSC hired a market-research firm to recruit a sample of
jury-eligible mock jurors to participate in the study. Recruited
participants who met eligibility requirements received a brief
description of the study in which they were asked to assume
the role of a juror in a trial case.  Participants were randomly
assigned to one of eight possible conditions in the experiment:
They watched one of the two videotaped sets of jury instruc-
tions (with either the specialized implicit-bias instruction or
the control instruction imbedded) and then read one of four
possible versions of the mock-trial scenario describing the evi-
dence in the case against the defendant (varying the race of the
defendant and the victim). After the presentation of evidence,
mock jurors indicated whether they thought the defendant was
guilty and, if so, recommended a sentence. The mock jurors
also took the Race Implicit Association Test (IAT), a popular
online test developed by researchers to identify, measure, and
study implicit bias. A total of 901 jury-eligible adults partici-
pated in the study, which was conducted in May and June
2013. On the whole, the composition of the participant group
reflected the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the
broader national population. A large majority of participants
demonstrated a preference for whites on the Race IAT, which is
also consistent with other national studies.
Overall, white participants across all conditions in the pre-
sent study convicted white defendants at a slightly higher rate
(65%) than black defendants (59%), although this difference
was not statistically significant. The specialized instruction did
not appear to significantly influence mock-juror verdict pref-
erence, confidence in verdict, or sentence severity. The authors
were unable to replicate with this sample the traditional base-
line pattern of “white juror bias” (i.e., the higher rate of guilty
verdicts and harsher sentences for black defendants in control
conditions) observed in prior similar studies, which precluded
a complete test of the value of the specialized instruction.28
Because prior studies demonstrated or replicated the juror-
bias effect successfully in a number of different settings, with a
number of different types of trial scenarios, and with designs
that varied in ecological validity (i.e., degree of resemblance to
natural court settings), it is not likely that the findings of the
present study are attributable to the web-based nature of the
study design. It is possible that the specific legal instructions
provided in the present study differed in a meaningful way from
past studies and that those differences were ultimately responsi-
ble for eliminating the juror-bias effect. However, it is unlikely
that these differences are the primary reason why the juror-bias
effect was not observed, as in the months following this study,
we learned that other contemporaneous studies in which simi-
lar legal instructions were not provided also failed to replicate
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Yuki et al., Cross-Cultural Differences in Relationship- and Group-
Based Trust, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 48 (2005).
9. Perspective-taking may help to reduce the accessibility and
expression of stereotypes (see Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B.
Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotype Expres-
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10. Instructions that encourage people to attend to and appreciate
one another’s differences (i.e., a multiculturalism philosophy)
are more effective at reducing expressions of bias than instruc-
tions to ignore individual differences (i.e., a colorblindness phi-
losophy); the latter may induce a backfire effect, thereby
increasing expressions of prejudice (e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum et
al., Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Color-
blindness in Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 918 (2008)). Note that the mere presence of a racial
minority on a panel of mostly white jurors may reduce the like-
lihood of a biased verdict (Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diver-
sity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006)).  
11. See Wegener et al., supra note 6. When individuals are held
accountable for the decision-making process itself, they tend to
think more deliberatively; however, when they are only held
accountable for the outcome, they may be more likely to
attempt to justify unjust decisions retrospectively (see Jennifer
S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999)). These instruc-
tions are designed to focus the juror on the process. In addition,
if people are made aware of their biases, those who endorse
egalitarianism but remain implicitly biased may actively correct
for bias in their decision making (see Leanne S. Son Hing et al.,
Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses Among Aver-
sive Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 71 (2002)). In the
presence of a relatively egalitarian-minded group, an individ-
ual’s judgments may become less stereotypic (see Gretchen B.
Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Inter-
group Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 645 (2001)). 
12. Emphasizes goal-setting and leadership involvement; see foot-
note 2.
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between the conditions. However, when the victim was described
as black, mock jurors who received the control instruction judged
the defense’s case to be stronger when the defendant was also
described as black than when the defendant was described as
white. This pattern of findings in the control conditions, however,
does not replicate the traditional juror-bias effect. Additional
research is needed to fully understand the observed effect.  
29. E.g., Yoona Kang et al., The Nondiscriminating Heart: Lovingkind-
ness Meditation Training Decreases Implicit Intergroup Bias, 143 J.
the original juror-bias effect. One intriguing potential explana-
tion for the failure to replicate the juror-bias effect in the present
study and in contemporaneous studies is that over time and
with increased media scrutiny to racial inequality, Americans
may have become increasingly aware of implicit forms of bias.
They may be particularly sensitive in research and other settings
in which they know or suspect that their individual responses
are monitored for analysis, and this sensitivity may have been
heightened at the time the study was conducted (i.e., during the
Florida trial of George Zimmerman). This heightened level of
awareness and sensitivity may have prompted many participants
to spontaneously self-correct for possible expressions of racial
bias, regardless of whether or not they received the specialized
jury instruction. Future research should explore this possibility
and its implications for contemporary jurors. 
Despite the absence of a baseline race-bias effect for jurors,
the study provided some preliminary evidence to suggest that a
specialized instruction could alter expressions of bias in juror
judgments. White jurors who received these specialized
instructions produced a different pattern of judgments of the
strength of the defendant’s case compared with participants
who received a control instruction. Specifically, in control con-
ditions, white jurors perceived the defendant’s case as signifi-
cantly stronger when the alleged crime occurred between a
black defendant and a black victim, compared with the scenario
that involved a white defendant and a black victim. This differ-
ence was eliminated in the specialized-instruction conditions.
Further research is needed to fully examine the impact of such
an instruction under a variety of conditions. Additional
research could also explore why, absent any bias-reduction
intervention, the black-on-black crime in the present study pro-
duced the highest strength-of-case ratings for the defense. A
complementary effect was not observed in favor of white defen-
dants when the victim was described as white, discounting a
same-race explanation for the effect. Finally, we also did not
observe any clear evidence of “backlash effects” (in which
mock jurors might seem to treat black defendants more
harshly) after hearing an implicit-bias instruction, but small
sample sizes limited these analyses. Future studies that con-
tinue to explore the potential utility of this type of instructional
intervention should also be designed to answer this question. 
THE VIEW FROM HERE
In this article, we have stressed the importance of empiri-
cally testing any new bias-reduction intervention for efficacy
before full-scale adoption and implementation. While we have
provided the specialized jury instruction used in this experi-
ment, along with citations to the existing scientific research
evidence that formed the theoretical basis for each of the
instruction’s components, we are not suggesting that any court
proceed at this point simply to adopt this instruction and move
on: We do not have sufficient data at this time to support a rec-
ommendation to use this or any other specialized jury instruc-
tion to mitigate juror implicit bias. Based on the results of one
study, the specialized jury instruction designed to address
implicit and explicit forms of bias in juror decision making
does not appear to be the panacea some hoped for. However,
the research evidence continues to expand on a variety of
strategies for reducing bias in decision making. Social scien-
tists continue in earnest to search for and test innovative bias-
reduction interventions. New evidence now exists to demon-
strate the utility of some bias-reduction interventions that, at
the time this study was conducted, were considered only the-
oretically promising.29 Many more strategies continue to show
promise but have not yet received empirical scrutiny. As basic
research evidence builds on more innovative approaches to
addressing bias in decision making, the court community will
benefit in time. 
Jennifer K. Elek, Ph.D., is a court research asso-
ciate with the National Center for State Courts.
In Dr. Elek’s recent work at NCSC, she has
focused on promoting gender and racial fairness
in the courts; on improving survey-based judi-
cial-performance-evaluation programs; on edu-
cating the court community about offender risk
and needs assessment and its role in evidence-
based sentencing; and on identifying and evaluating the efficacy of
problem-solving-court programs. She holds a Ph.D. in social psy-
chology from Ohio University, an M.A. from the College of William
and Mary, and a B.A. from Vassar College.
Paula Hannaford-Agor is the director of the
NCSC Center for Jury Studies. She joined the
NCSC Research Division in May 1993 and rou-
tinely conducts research and provides courts and
court personnel with technical assistance and
education on the topics of jury-system manage-
ment, jury-trial procedure, and juror decision
making. She has authored or contributed to
numerous books and articles on the American jury, including Jury
Trial Innovations (2d ed. 2006), The Promise and Challenges of
Jury System Technology (NCSC 2003), and Managing Notori-
ous Trials (1998). She is faculty for the ICM courses Jury System
Management and Promise and Challenges of Jury System Technol-
ogy. As adjunct faculty at William & Mary Law School, she teaches
a seminar on the American jury. She holds a J.D. and a Master’s in
Public Policy from the College of William and Mary.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1306 (2014), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034150; Adam Lueke & Bryan Gib-
son, Mindfulness Meditation Reduces Implicit Age and Race Bias, 6
SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 284 (2015), available at
http://spp.sagepub.com/content/6/3/284; Calvin K. Lai et al.,
Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative Investigation
of 17 Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1306
(2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036260.
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Across
1 Ready, willing partner
5 Half-___ (flag position)
9 Omar of “Scream 2”
13 Harriet Beecher Stowe novel
14 Wrinkly Jamaican fruit
15 Half-moon tide
16 Rock’s Jon Bon ___
17 Campus guy with a list
18 New Delhi dress
19 Start of a quip
22 Soda cooler
23 Picnic ruiner
24 Peewee or Della
25 Attendance-taker’s count
27 C’est la ___
29 Lard, essentially
30 Reach, as success
33 San ___ Obispo
34 Part 2 of the quip
37 “Compos mentis”
38 Asserts
39 Nev. clock setting
40 Four-stringed instrument,
briefly
41 Ill-tempered
45 Cool cat’s words of 
understanding
47 ___ Paulo, Brazil
49 Excessively
50 End of the quip
54 “Make ___!” 
(Star Trek command)
55 Ground
56 Legal memo phrase
57 Be out of
58 Jai ___ 
(game resembling handball)
59 NASA’s Armstrong
60 Mardi ___
61 Comic actor Lahr
62 Better figures?
Down
1 Abut on
2 Mile High athlete
3 River walls
4 Polish, as a manuscript
5 “Here’s ___ your eye!”
6 Performer’s promoter
7 Smeltery residue
8 Lilliputian
9 Follow in sequence
10 Like a lover, not a fighter
11 Fly behind a boat
12 Small upright pianos
20 “___ makes waste”
21 Mine output
26 Gutter’s spot
27 “Livin’ la ___ Loca”
28 Part of MIT (abbr.)
31 Kind of master
32 Price of a hand
33 Sax-playing Simpson
34 Monthly reading for a 
utility worker
35 Where there are
“too many fish”
36 Male operatic voice
37 Throwing down hard, 
as a football
40 Newswire org.
PROMISE? by Victor Fleming
42 “___ Soul Picnic” 
(1968 Laura Nyro song)
43 Much more than warm
44 Alpine refrains
46 Portable music players
47 Submarine system
48 Check out, as books
51 Meatloaf serving, say
52 Rival of Harvard
53 Brown-bagger?
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 127.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2015 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Sheraton Seattle
October 4-7
$189 single/double
2016 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
TORONTO, ONTARIO
Toronto Marriott Eaton Centre
September 25-30
$214 (Canadian) single/double 
(Approx. $175 (U.S.) based on current exchange rate)
THE AJA ANNUAL CONFERENCE:  THE BEST JUDICIAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE ANYWHERE
For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences.
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THROUGH THE PRESENTATION OF WHITE PAPERS 
ADDRESSING KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO JUDGES
S
Procedural Fairness: 
A Key Ingredient in 
Public Satisfaction
Approved by the AJA 2007
http://goo.gl/afCYT 
S
The Debate over 
the Selection and 
Retention of Judges: 
How Judges Can 
Ride the Wave 
Approved by the AJA 2011
http://goo.gl/98IGN 
S
Minding the Court: 
Enhancing the 
Decision-Making
Process
Approved by the AJA 2012
http://goo.gl/F7NxE
MAKING BETTER JUDGES™
President Brian MacKenzie appointed a new Bylaws Com-
mittee charged with the responsibility for reviewing and mod-
ernizing the language of the bylaws to reflect current trends
and law regarding section 501(c)(6) nonprofit organizations.
Immediate Past President Elliott Zide was appointed chair, and
the following members now actively serve on this committee:
Judges Susan Burke (MN), Elizabeth Hines (MI), Richard
Kayne (WA), Russell Otter (Ontario), John B. Williams (MO),
and Sheila Woods-Skipper (PA).
The committee has had the benefit of researching bylaws,
policies, and procedures of other nonprofit organizations. The
process to present the revisions below has been inclusive and
participatory. An interim report of the committee was made to
the Executive Committee at its January meeting, and a more
detailed report was made to the Board of Governors at the
April midyear meeting in Fort Myers. The committee reports
are available to the membership and can be found in the min-
utes of the Fort Myers Executive Committee and Board of Gov-
ernors meetings. The committee has benefited from open dis-
cussions at these meetings, as is reflected in what follows.
In accordance with current Article 18 of the bylaws, you are
notified that the committee will be offering a motion at the
General Assembly Meeting in Seattle in October 2015 seeking
the adoption by a single vote of amended and restated bylaws.
A summary of the proposed changes is printed here. The full
proposal was sent to all AJA members for whom we have email
addresses on August 19, 2015; it is also posted on the AJA web-
site (amjudges.org). 
You are invited to make comments or suggestions. Please
forward your comments to Shelley Rockwell at
srockwell@ncsc.org. Between now and the meeting, the com-
mittee will consider each comment or suggestion. 
Judge Elliott Zide
AJA Immediate Past President and
Bylaws Committee Chair
SUMMARY OF BYLAW REVISIONS
Article I: Name and Office
• Unchanged
Article II: Purpose
• Sec. 1: Now sets forth the general purpose, objective, and
goal of the American Judges Association using the lan-
guage and tone as set forth in the current AJA website.
• Sec. 2: Sets forth the language for the general powers of
the Association. 
• Sec. 3: Adds specific language in the powers of the Associ-
ation stating AJA’s commitment to diversity. 
• AJA will actively recruit membership that reflects
the diversity of the judiciary.
• AJA will support, promote, and encourage present
and prospective members to be knowledgeable
about diversity issues.
• AJA will engage in membership and leadership
recruitment and retention strategies to achieve its
commitment to a diverse membership and to active
participation in all of the affairs of the organization.
• Sec. 4: Now reads as follows: AJA shall operate not-for-
profit and exclusively for education and charitable pur-
poses within the meaning of section 501(c)(6) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1975 or the corresponding sec-
tions for past or future tax codes.
Article III: Membership
• Sec. 1: Voting Members
• The definition of “Eligible Courts” has been com-
bined with the definition of “Voting Members” to
clearly describe the AJA’s existence as a member-dri-
ven organization of diverse judicial officers and arbi-
trators from eligible courts.
• Sec. 2: Associate Members (a membership-drive opportu-
nity)
• Specifically allows for affiliated and honorary mem-
bership for those who support the objectives and
purposes of AJA but who are not judicial officers or
arbitrators in eligible courts. 
• Sec. 3: Honorary membership for the highest judicial offi-
cer in states, provinces, etc.
• Sec. 5: Termination of Membership
• Shifts initial suspension authority from the Board of
Governors to the Executive Committee, with final
suspension approval remaining with the Board of
Governors. 
• Shifts appeal and reinstatement authority from the
General Assembly to the Board of Governors. 
• Sec. 6: Affiliated or Association Memberships (cosmetic
changes only)
Article IV: Dues 
• Rewritten to clarify the authority and role of the Board of
Governors in establishing the schedule of dues for all
groups and types of members.
HIGHLIGHTING REMAINING REVISIONS RELATING TO
HOW THE AJA CONDUCTS ITS BUSINESS 
Article VII: Board of Governors
• District Representatives will be eliminated from the orga-
nization.
• The general powers to conduct the affairs and business of
the Association remain in a restructured Board of Gover-
nors.
• The number of districts will be reduced from 14 to 7:
NOTICE OF PROPOSED BYLAWS REVISIONS
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• District 1: Canada
• District 2: Northeast: Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont
• District 3: Southeast: Delaware, District of Colum-
bia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Georgia, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the US Vir-
gin Islands
• District 4: South/Southwest: Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, Mexico, and Central American countries
• District 5: Western: Alaska, Washington, Oregon,
California, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, Wyoming,
Utah, Hawaii, American Samoa, Marshall Islands,
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and
military overseas
• District 6: West Central: Colorado, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Wiscon-
sin, Minnesota, and Michigan
• District 7: Central: Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Indiana,
Kentucky, West Virginia, and Tennessee
• The Board of Governors now will be composed of:
• Up to six members representing each of the seven
districts (for a maximum of 42) who will be elected
for two-year terms; term limits are eliminated.
• The duly elected and qualified officers of the Asso-
ciation.
• The three presidential appointments to the Executive
Committee IF they are not otherwise Governors.
• AJA past presidents following the completion of
their term of office shall serve as at-large voting
members of the Board as long as they remain dues-
paying members of the Association.
• The role of the Executive Committee remains the same.
However, the three presidential appointments to the Exec-
utive Committee do not have to come from the Board of
Governors, nor do they require Board of Governors
approval.
• The language about standing and ad hoc committees has
been modernized.
Article V: Conferences and Meetings: The language in this
section about conferences has been modernized.
Article VI: General Assembly: The language remains the
same.
Article VII: The Board of Governors section has been revised
as stated above, with other portions remaining the same. 
Article VIII: Except as follows, this article about officers
remains the same: However, the appointment of the Treasurer
and confirmation by the Board of Governors has now been
more carefully articulated. The revised bylaws provide as fol-
lows: “the Treasurer shall be nominated by the executive com-
mittee at its meeting prior to the annual meeting and elected
by the members of the board of governors at a board meeting
immediately following each annual conference General
Assembly.”
Article IX: Court of Appeals remains in place.
Old Article X about the district representatives has been elim-
inated.
Old Article XI about sections of the Association has now been
eliminated. 
Old Article XII, captioned “Education conferences” (referring
to education conferences in districts), has been eliminated.  
The new Article X, formerly Article XIII: Committees, has
been revised as follows: The names and numbers of the stand-
ing committees have been reduced and changed so that the
standing committees in alphabetical order are now awards,
budget, bylaws, conference, conference site, domestic violence,
education, executive, membership, nominations, public infor-
mation and relations, publications, and resolutions. There is
language that allows for creation of other standing committees
by the Board of Governors. Section 2 is now called “Other
Committees” and states as follows: “Other committees or task
forces of an immediate or non-recurring character may be cre-
ated by the president or by resolution of the Board of Gover-
nors to investigate, study and implement matters relating to
specific purposes, business and objects of the Association. The
term of such committee shall end at the next annual confer-
ence of the Association following its creation unless continued
by the executive committee.”
The new Article XI is now captioned “Board of Governors and
Committees, Manner of Acting” and reads as follows:
• Sec. 1: Participation by Governors
• Allows for the Board of Governors to conduct meet-
ings electronically. 
• Sec. 2: Committee Meetings
• Allows for committees to conduct meetings elec-
tronically. 
Article XII: Fiscal Matters was Article XIV, and the language
remains the same.
Article XIII: Dissolution used to be Article XV, and language
remains the same.
Article XIV: Rules of Procedure used to be Article XVI, and
language remains the same.
Article XV: Definitions used
to be Article XVII, and lan-
guage remains the same.
Article XVI: Amendments to
the Bylaws used to be Article
XVIII, and language remains
the same. 
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
Quarterly Summaries of
Procedural-Fairness Research
ProceduralFairness.org
Since January 2014, the website Proce-
duralFairness.org has been posting quar-
terly summaries of new research. The
website was created in 2012 to provide
background information about how to
improve procedural fairness in courts and
policing. The quarterly research reports
make it easy for those who want to follow
developments in this area to find descrip-
tions of all the latest research in one
place. In many cases, the report even
links to the full-text articles.
These quarterly summaries are pre-
pared by Justine Greve, M.A., a staff
member with the Kansas Court of
Appeals, and Shelley Spacek Miller, J.D.,
a staff member with the National Center
for State Courts. They search the Internet
and other sources to locate the most
notable procedural-fairness scholarship
released over the past three months.
Their lists include everything from acad-
emic books and articles to presentations,
reports, podcasts, and web resources.
Magazine articles and news stories on
procedural fairness are listed as well.
The reports focus primarily on the jus-
tice system—courts and judging, prisons
and policing. But they touch on a wide
range of topics, including a number of
studies on business and management.
Judges may find those of interest too;
after all, we manage employees and col-
lectively run a very large enterprise.
c
RECENT ARTICLES 
WORTH NOTING 
Tina Rosenberg, The Simple Idea That
Could Transform US Criminal Justice, THE
GUARDIAN, June 23, 2015.
http://goo.gl/y66fB3 
This article goes in-depth to describe
how Judge Victoria Pratt has transformed
her courtroom in the Newark (NJ)
Municipal Court into a model court for
procedural fairness.
Guardian reporter Tina Rosenberg
spent time observing the court and talk-
ing to Judge Pratt. She also interviewed
Yale Law School professor Tom Tyler,
who has written about procedural justice
from a social-science perspective for
more than two decades, and Minneapolis
judge and former American Judges Asso-
ciation President Kevin Burke, who has
practiced and preached procedural fair-
ness in courts for almost as long. 
Judge Pratt began to learn about pro-
cedural fairness after a city official gave
her a report about the Community Justice
Center in Red Hook, a neighborhood in
Brooklyn. She went to observe the Red
Hook court, talked to its judge, Alex Cal-
abrese, and saw how the principles of
procedural fairness could be used. She
concluded, as she told Rosenberg,
“Newark really needs this.” And she has
made these principles the basis for her
approach to the defendants who come
through her court. 
Rosenburg’s article combines informa-
tion from Pratt, Tyler, and Burke, stories
about several specific defendants and
their treatment in Pratt’s courtroom, and
reflections from the court’s longtime pub-
lic defender. Rosenberg’s lengthy article is
perhaps the best treatment of procedural
fairness in courts ever to appear in the
mainstream press. Judges would find it
informative; court staff and the public
would find it a great introduction to how
these concepts may infuse effective court-
room practices.
Elizabeth Ingriselli, Mitigating Jurors’
Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and
Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J.
1690 (2015).
http://goo.gl/HWpIRW 
This law-review note presents an
interesting experiment about how the
timing and content of jury instructions
may be used to reduce racial bias by
jurors. This empirical research from 
Elizabeth Ingriselli may be particularly
interesting after you read the article in
this issue by National Center for State
Courts researchers Jennifer Elek and
Paula Hannaford-Agor about their own
attempt to reduce juror bias through an
experimental jury instruction. 
Ingriselli reviews in some detail the
social-science research related to racial
bias, including research about what leads
to the implicit bias often found in studies
of whites who unknowingly exhibit bias
against blacks. She concludes that these
studies “suggest that when race is not
explicit, white jurors are not aware of
their biases and hence do not try to sup-
press them, which results in biased deci-
sion making.” On the other hand,
“[w]hen race is salient, whether explic-
itly or implicitly, whites attempt to com-
pensate for their implicit negative feel-
ings toward blacks by suppressing their
biases.” Thus, her expectation was that
when race was not salient and evidence
was ambiguous, white jurors’ implicit
biases would emerge.
Her experiment used 412 people who
completed an implicit-association test to
measure implicit racial bias and then read
and completed a survey about a crime
scenario. They were told that the research
was intended to examine how jurors eval-
uate evidence and determine guilt. Jury
instructions were also given—sometimes
before participants read the evidence,
sometimes afterwards. Ingriselli found
that the data provided some support for
the proposition that bias was reduced
when a “debiasing” instruction was given
before the evidence was presented. She
also offered suggestions for future
research.
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